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THERMAL SURVEILLANCE AND
THE EXTRAORDINARY DEVICE EXCEPTION:
RE-DEFINING THE SCOPE OF
THE KATZ ANALYSIS
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment .... It was even more conceivable
that they watched everybody all the time. .... You had to live-did
live, from habit that became instinct-in the assumption that every
sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every
movement scrutinized.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the dark hours of an early winter morning, law enforcement officials
aboard a police helicopter move swiftly above the treeline en route to the
residence of Mr. Theodore Robinson.' While the police have suspected Mr.
Robinson of illegally cultivating marijuana in his home for some time, their
mission tonight is to gather sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to
obtain a warrant to search Mr. Robinson's home.' Beneath the aircraft, the
police have mounted the latest in high-tech surveillance devices: the Forward
Looking Infrared Device (FLIR).4 The FLIR detects heat emanating from
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 4 (1949).
2. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1995).
3. The officers' suspicions concerning Mr. Robinson surfaced when they learned that he had
ordered 30 high-pressure, sodium lights, the type commonly used for indoor marijuana cultivation.
Id. The officers then subpoenaed electrical utility records for Mr. Robinson's residence and
determined that his residence displaced abnormally high electrical usage. Id. This excessive power
usage is indicative of the high-wattage grow lamps needed for indoor cannabis cultivation. Id. at
1331 n.10.
4. Id. at 1327. Thermal imagery has emerged across the country as the government's most
recent weapon in its war on drugs. See generally Lan Nguyen, Piercing the Cover of Darkness; New
Device Lets Arlington Police Capture Images at Night, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1995, at Vol. Court
Requires Warrantfor Thermal Scan Reuter, WASH. PosT, Oct. 5, 1995, at A 14. William Yelverton,
Smoking Gun?, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 29, 1995, at 1; James J. Kilpatrick, A Lot of Hot Air, BALT.
SUN, Sept. 2, 1994, at 21A; Paul Valentine, Putting the Heat on Crime at light: State Police
Helicopters Use Infrared Cameras to Detect Wrongdoers, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1993, at MI; Rich
Henson, Police Going After Marijuana Harvest, PHIL. INQUIR., Sept. 12, 1993, at BI; Tim Bryant,
DEA Targets Indoor Pot Growers, ST. L. POST., May 9, 1993, at ID.
The use of thermal imagery to detect indoor marijuana cultivation has also sparked much
debate within the academic arena. See Lisa Tuenge Hale, Comment, United States v. Ford: The
Eleventh Circuit Permits Unrestricted Police Use of Thermal Surveillance on Private Property
Without a Warrant, 29 GA. L. Ray. 819 (1995); Daniel J. Polatsek, Note, Thermal Imaging and
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certain objects and transforms the relative heat patterns into a visual image on
a screen which can then be saved on videotape.5
The officers take FLIR readings of Mr. Robinson's residence as well as
surrounding objects. 6 The readings reveal that Mr. Robinson's residence is
considerably warmer than the neighboring houses, evidence which is indicative
of the high-wattage grow lamps necessary for indoor marijuana cultivation.7
Relying on this information, the officers successfully obtain a search warrant
and eventually arrest Mr. Robinson.$ At trial, Mr. Robinson argues that the
police violated his fourth amendment9 rights by using the FLIR on his home
without first securing a search warrant.'" The Eleventh Circuit, however,
concludes that Mr. Robinson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
the Fourth Amendment: Pushing the Katz Test Towards Terminal Velocity, 13 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 453 (1995); Tracy M. White, Note, The Heat Is On: The Warrantless Use
of Infrared Surveillance to Detect Indoor Marijuana Cultivation, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 295 (1995);
Mindy G. Wilson, Note, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This TechnologicalAdvance
in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth Amendment Protections Against
Unreasonable Searches?, 83 KY. L.J. 891 (1995); Melinda Foster, Note, State v. Young: A Cool
View Toward Infrared Thermal-Detection Devices, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 135 (1994); Susan Moore,
Note, Does Heat Emanate Beyond the Threshold?: Home Infrared Emissions, Remote Sensing, and
the Fourth Amendment Threshold, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 803 (1994); Lynne M. Pochurek, Note,
From the Battlefront to the Homefront: Infrared Surveillance and the War on Drugs Place Privacy
Under Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 137 (1994).
5. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328 n.2. For a detailed description of the FLIR's technological
functions and capabilities, see infra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
6. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1995).
7. Id. at 1330 n.8. Indoor marijuana cultivation operations generally require between 400 and
1000 watt bulbs. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 664 (1994). For a discussion of the precise method used by police to detect these types of
operations, see infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
8. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327-28.
9. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (1 th Cir. 1995). A particular government
activity must first constitute a "search" before its reasonableness can be put to scrutiny under the
Fourth Amendment. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's current
standard used to determine if a particular police activity is a "search" under the Fourth Amendment
was established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz stated that a "search" occurs
only when the government intrudes on an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of the Katz decision, see infra notes 122-32 and
accompanying text.
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in the heat emanating from his home and, therefore, is not entitled to fourth
amendment protection."
The court's holding in United States v. Robinson2 is, however, only one
approach to the country's most recent controversial fourth amendment issue:
whether the use of a FLIR on an individual's residence to detect heat patterns
constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. This seemingly straight-
forward inquiry has proved to be an enigma, resulting in a split among various
state and federal courts. While several courts have held that the use of the FLIR
is not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, 3 several others have held that
it is a "search." 4 The remaining courts faced with the FLIR issue have
avoided deciding the "search" question altogether. 5
The Fourth Amendment requires that all "searches" and "seizures" by the
government be reasonable. "' Thus, only those police contacts which rise to the
11. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330. The court reasoned that "[n]one of the interests which form
the basis for the need for protection of a residence, namely the intimacy, personal autonomy and
privacy associated with a home, are threatened by [FLIR] thermal imagery." Id. (quoting United
States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994)). But see United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp.
1518, 1533 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (holding that the government's use of a FLIR on the defendant's
home did constitute a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
12. 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995).
13. Cases which have held that the use of a FLIR on a person's residence to detect certain heat
patterns is not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment include: United States v.
Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (1 lth Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United
States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460 (E.D. Wash. 1994); United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp.
1393 (D. Wyo. 1994); United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787 (D. Or. 1992); United States v.
Deaner, 1992 WL 209966 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992), affrd on other grounds, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir.
1993); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), affd on other grounds
sub nom. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d
807 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
14. Those cases which have held that the use of the FLIR on a person's home is a fourth
amendment "search" include: United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cit. 1995); United
States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
15. Those cases involving the FLIR which did not reach the "search" issue include: United
States v. Kyllo, 1994 WL 533802 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1994); United States v. Pugh, 1994 U.S. APP.
LEXIS 25480 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1994); United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cit. 1993); United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Casanova, 835
F. Supp. 702 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); State v. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d 658 (N.D. 1995); State v. Johnson,
879 P.2d 984 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Russell, 857 P.2d 220 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For the specific text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note
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level of "searches" or "seizures" are scrutinized under the Fourth
Amendment. 7 All other police activity may be conducted absolutely free of
the limitations imposed by the amendment.' Thus, whether or not the use of
a FLIR on a person's home amounts to a "search" is a very critical inquiry, as
a negative answer forecloses fourth amendment debate altogether.' 9 On the
other hand, an affirmative answer would only require that the police conduct
their activities according to the reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment. 2' The split in the courts2' regarding this preliminary, yet
crucially important inquiry, raises serious concerns about the current "search"
standard's ability to effectively analyze such a highly sophisticated instrument.'
17. See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendnentfor the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND.
L.J. 549, 555 (1990) (hereinafter Katz, Twenty-first Century]. See also Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 388 (1974) (stating that "[t]o label
any police activity a 'search' . . . within the ambit of the [Fourth] [A]mendment is to impose [the
reasonableness] restrictions upon it"); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: 'Second to None
in the Bill of Rights, " 75 ILL. B.J. 424, 427 (1987) (stating that for the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment to apply at all, "the police conduct in question must constitute either a 'search' or a
'seizure' as those terms are used in the Fourth Amendment"); Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court
and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L. REv. 383, 383 (1991).
Professor Berner refers to the Fourth Amendment as a "reach-grasp" dichotomy. Id. He
states that the question of "what is a 'search?'" defines the "reach" of the Fourth Amendment and
could be restated as "what general type of governmental activity is this amendment interested in
scrutinizing and regulating?" Id. The question of reasonableness then becomes the amendment's
"grasp" and could be restated as "from this universe of searches, which are permitted and which
prohibited?" Id.
18. See Katz, Twenty-firs Century, supra note 17, at 556 (stating that the 'search"
determination is a crucial one because a "negative answer forecloses further review"); Amsterdam,
supra note 17, at 388 (noting that police activities which fall into neither the category of 'searches"
nor the category of "seizures" may be conducted as unreasonably as the police may so choose);
Berner, supra note 17, at 385 (stating that to determine that a particular police activity is not a
'search" is to completely close all debate on the fourth amendment issue).
19. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 600 (Wash. 1994). The court in Young noted that police
officers conduct thermal investigations not only on a suspect's home, but on the neighboring homes
as well. Id. The court stated that to hold that such police activity is not a "search" would place
absolutely no limitations "on the government's ability to use the device on any private residence,
on any particular night, even if no criminal activity is suspected." Id.
20. See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 388; Katz, Twenty-first Century, supra note 17, at 556;
Berner, supra note 17, at 385.
21. For a list of those cases which are split over whether the warrantless use of a FLIR on the
home is a 'search," see supra notes 13-15.
22. The Supreme Court's current 'search" standard, articulated in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), establishes that a "search" only occurs when the government intrudes on an
individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 360 (Harlan, I., concurring). While the
Katz standard has been widely criticized as being deficient in all applications, see infra notes 25,254
and accompanying text, this note seeks to recognize Katz's inherent inability to be logically or fairly
applied to highly technological devices which are uncommon to society. See infra § VI.A
(proposing an 'extraordinary device" exception to the Katz standard).
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The Supreme Court's seminal "search" case, Katz v. United States, 
2
establishes the principle that a search occurs only when the government intrudes
upon a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy."' While many fourth
amendment scholars have criticized the Court's treatment of the "search"
issue,' this Note argues that the Court can preserve the integrity of its
"search" jurisprudence by recognizing Katz as a limited doctrine, incapable of
dealing with such high-tech, extraordinary devices as the FLIR. This Note
suggests that the Katz inquiry can only be applied in those instances where it is
fair and logical to require individuals to form expectations of privacy.' If a
certain device or method of intrusion is not part of the social dynamic, such that
it is not integrated into the common societal experience, then any mention of
"expectations of privacy" is both illogical and destructive of those privacy rights
so vital to any free society.'
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Berner, supra note 17, at 386 (referring to the Katz decision as
the Supreme Court's "polestar search" case); Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 382 (stating that Katz
v. United States "marks a watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence").
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. For a more in-depth discussion of Katz's 'reasonable expectation
of privacy" standard, see infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 349 (stating that the Supreme Court's "search"
jurisprudence is not its "most successful product"); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and
the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REv. 1289, 1310 (1981) (arguing that the
Court's approach in handling the "search" question is "at best confusing"); Berner, supra note 17,
at 384 (observing that fourth amendment critics are in an "apoplectic frenzy" over the Supreme
Court's "search" decisions); Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of
'Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REv. 541, 543
(1988) (stating that the majority of the scholarly community agrees that the Supreme Court's
.search" cases "[do] not make sense"); Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth
Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973) (stating that "the fourth
amendment cases are a mess!"); Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the
Meanings of "Searches" in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 323-24
(1984) (noting that most scholarly discussion of the Supreme Court's "search" jurisprudence is
"highly alarmist in tone").
26. This note does not criticize Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard but rather
criticizes the manner in which the courts have applied this standard. See infra text accompanying
notes 147-207. More specifically, this note argues that the Katz standard is inherently limited in its
application to sophisticated devices like the FLIR. See infra § VI.A.
27. See infra notes 133-46 and accompanying text.
28. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47,
85 (1974). Professor Weinreb states that "[the privacy secured by the [Flourth [A]mendment
fosters large social interests. Political and moral discussion, affirmation and dissent, need places
to be born and nurtured, and shelter from unwanted publicity." Id. He goes on to argue that fourth
amendment privacy and security notions help us to extend our personality by allowing us:
to leave our pajamas on the floor, the bed unmade and dishes in the sink, pictures of
secret heroes on the wall, a stack of comic books or love letters on the shelf; it allows
us to be sloppy or compulsively neat, to enjoy what we have without exposing our tastes
to the world.
Id. at 53. See also Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 388 (noting that the knowledge which each citizen
is free to express himself or herself freely "is the hallmark of an open society"). The Supreme
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This Note argues that the post-Katz cases, rather than directly applying the
Katz decision, have created anomalous doctrines. 9  These doctrines both
deflect attention away from the true spirit of the Katz analysis and make it more
difficult for courts to recognize the standard's limitations concerning
extraordinary devices.' As a result, courts have pigeonholed FLIR
surveillance into a standard which is neither logically nor fairly capable of
analyzing such technology.3' This Note offers an "extraordinary device
exception" to the Katz standard which would recognize Katz's inherent
limitations and automatically subject devices not common to society, like the
FLIR, to fourth amendment scrutiny.32 This exception will benefit current
fourth amendment jurisprudence in two ways: 1) it will strengthen the integrity
of the Katz standard by recognizing the standard's limitations and by prohibiting
its application to illogical and unfair situations;33 and 2) it will more
appropriately safeguard those privacy interests which face extinction as a result
of the government's growing arsenal of high-tech surveillance methods.' The
Court asserted that privacy's antithesis, "police omniscience[,] is one of the most effective tools of
tyranny." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. See infra notes 147-207 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
31. See generally Bradley J. Plaschke, United States v. Deaner: Thermal Imagery, the Latest
Assault on the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER INFO. L. 607,
612-24 (1994); Lisa J. Steele, Waste Heat and Garbage: The Legalization of Warrantless Infrared
Searches, 29 CRiM. L. BULL. 19, 28-38 (1993) [hereinafter Steele, Infrared Searches]. For a list
of those decisions that attempted to apply the Katz standard to thermal surveillance, see supra notes
13-15.
32. See infra notes 256-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "extraordinary device
exception." This exception does not prohibit the use of certain sophisticated devices. Id. Rather,
it merely requires that the police act reasonably when employing the aid of such devices. Id.
33. See infra § VI.A.
34. See Katz, Twenty-first Century, supra note 17, at 551 (stating that the list of permissible
governmental surveillance techniques is more indicative of a police state than a free and open
society); David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REv. 563,
563 (1990) (noting that the police have developed highly sophisticated methods of surveillance with
increasing frequency). See also Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models
of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 647, 677-78 (1988).
Professor Gutterman notes that law enforcement agencies have acquired an increasingly large
number of sophisticated surveillance devices, including "Questar telescopes, Star-tron 606, mapping
cameras, and an unlimited variety of infrared scopes and goggles enabl[ing] the government to gather
otherwise unavailable information for investigatory purposes." Id. at 678. Gutterman argues that,
"[u]nrestrained, over time, technology can steadily erode our privacy protections, thus making our
society terribly oppressive." Id. at 735.
In 1890, Justice Brandeis, with great vision, observed that "numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from
the house-tops.'" 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890). For a discussion of those court decisions
dealing with the constitutionality of certain modem police surveillance techniques, see infra notes
147-207 and accompanying text.
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proposed exception, however, does not prohibit the government from using
highly technological devices; rather, it merely requires that this use be
reasonable.35
Section II of this Note provides a technical description of the FLIR and its
capabilities and outlines the process used by the government to detect the illicit
cultivation of marijuana through the indentification of heat patterns.3 Section
III analyzes the development of the Court's seminal "search" case in United
States v. Kat?7 and discusses the nature of Katz's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard, noting its inherent limitations.' Section IV explores the
post-Katz search cases and argues that these cases, rather than applying the true
Katz standard, have created anomalous, generic doctrines which deflect attention
away from the true spirit of the Katz decision.39 Section V of this Note
discusses the conflicting FLIR decisions and argues that these types of
"extraordinary devices" cannot logically nor fairly be examined under Katz's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard.' Finally, Section VI proposes
an "extraordinary device" exception to the Katz doctrine, whereby those devices
which are not commonly integrated into society bypass the Katz "search"
analysis and automatically undergo fourth amendment scrutiny.4 The proposed
exception does not seek to prohibit certain governmental activity but rather
merely requires that the government's use of certain uncommon, sophisticated
devices be reasonable.42
II. THE FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED DEVICE (FLIR)
The FLIR has gained increasing popularity among police officers within the
past several years.4' Its heat-detecting capabilities allow officers to obtain
35. See Berner, supra note 17, at 385. Professor Berner stresses the fact that to hold that a
certain police activity is not a "search" is to close debate, but to hold that the activity is a "search"
merely begins debate concerning the reasonableness of the police activity. Id.
36. See infra notes 43-94 and accompanying text.
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
38. See infra notes 96-146 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 147-207 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 208-55 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 256-76 and accompanying text.
42. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
43. See United States Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency, Domestic Cannabis
Eradication and Suppression Project Final Report at 29. The report states that:
[tihe successful use of off the shelf thermal video technology to confirm inordinate
thermal emissions consistent with the operation of numerous high intensity grow lights
was demonstrated in 1988-89. During 1990, this technology was utilized in numerous
locations throughout the United States to support justification of a probable cause
conclusion. The thermal surveillance data along with other investigative information
were used in numerous search warrant affidavits.
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evidence of indoor marijuana growth without physically entering the home."
FLIR readings which reveal that a particular home is emanating an abnormal
amount of heat suggest the possible existence of high-wattage grow lamps in the
home,' the type necessary for indoor marijuana cultivation. 4  The FLIR
evidence can then be used to establish probable cause and to obtain a search
warraht.47 The FLIR device has been instrumental across the country in
supplying the evidence necessary to arrest and charge individuals with various
criminal marijuana offenses.4 In the courtroom, however, the use of the FLIR
has created enormous controversy.49
Before debating the constitutionality of a particular device or method of
investigation, a technical analysis of the device or method is first requited.s'
The more complex or sophisticated the device, the more important it becomes
to initially determine the device's basic functions and capabilities. Because the
FLIR is a highly sophisticated device which operates outside of the natural
human senses, a thorough understanding of its functions, capabilities, and
methods for detecting marijuana cultivation is necessary."
Id. See also supra note 4.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057-58 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 664 (1994) (stating that the grow lamps used for indoor marijuana cultivation generate
temperatures of 150 degrees or more); United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1521-23 (W.D.
Wis. 1994); Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 20; Plaschke, supra note 31, at 607-08,607
nn.2, 4. Note, however, that a "search" does not require that there be a physical trespass. See infra
note 125.
45. See, e.g., Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1523 (stating that police officers look for "hot spots" on
a suspect's residence); Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 24-25; Plaschke, supra note 31,
at 607-08, 607 n.2, 4. In addition to taking readings of the suspect's home, officers will often take
readings of the neighboring homes for comparative purposes. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593,
595 (Wash. 1994).
46. See, e.g., Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057.
47. See, e.g., id. The officers in Pinson submitted the FLIR evidence in addition to high
electrical usage records in an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant. Id. For a discussion
of the Supreme Court's current probable cause standard for the issuance of a search warrant, see
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Gates court held that "[t]he task of the issuing
[judge] is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him,.., there is a fair probability that contraband ... will be found
in a particular place." Id.
48. See supra notes 4, 43.
49. Both federal and state courts are in complete disagreement over whether or not the use of
a FLIR on a person's residence constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. See United
States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1525-30 (W.D. Wis. 1994). For a list of those courts which
have split on the issue, see supra notes 13-15.
50. See Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 24.
51. See Plaschke, supra note 31, at 618 (stating that FLIR technology is similar to an x-ray or
magnetometer because it detects information which cannot be detected by the human senses or sense-
enhancing devices); Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 24 (explaining that the FLIR is a
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 [1996], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss3/7
1996] RE-DEFINING THE KATZ ANALYSIS 1079
A. The Hardware
Developed by the United States Army to locate enemy vehicles during
combat, 2 the FLIR is a device which detects infrared emissions (or heat)
emanating from a certain object.5 3 The FLIR has a lens which allows infrared
light to pass through it onto a detector.' The FLIR then converts the thermal
energy into a color on a predetermined color scale and displays this information
on a screen.55 Generally, the image on the screen appears in various shades
of grey depending on the amount of heat which the targeted object is
emitting.' The hotter the object, the more white it appears on the screen,
while the cooler objects appear more grey. 5  Thus, the FLIR does not
quantitatively reveal to its operator the temperature of a certain object but rather
highly technological instrument which operates outside of the human senses). Steele further states
that before applying the Katz standard to thermal surveillance to determine whether the use of the
FLIR is a "search," it is first necessary to consider the nature of the FLIR device. Id.
52. See United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847, 848 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994). Infrared
emissions occupy a part of the infrared spectrum, including radio waves, microwaves, heat, visible
light, ultraviolet light, X-rays, and gamma rays. See Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at
24. These different forms of energy vary by the wavelength of theelectric and magnetic fields. Id.
See also Plaschke, supra note 31, at 620 (stating that "[tihermal emissions are invisible, odorless,
silent and generally not detectable by human touch").
54. See Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 24. The infrared light actually passes
through the lens onto a series of mirrors which direct it onto the detector. Id. The detector then
uses a highly sophisticated process to translate the light into an electrical signal which can be
amplified, processed, and recorded on videotape or presented visually on a television-like screen.
Id.
55. See, e.g., Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522. The FLIR's outstanding characteristic is that it
collects energy which cannot otherwise be detected by humans and transforms that information into
a visual image which can be viewed by the thermographer. Id. The view on the screen displays
the actual objects with less definition than a standard television. Id.
56. See, e.g., id. at 1522; State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994). See also
Plaschke, supra note 31, at 607 n.2 (discussing information obtained in an interview with Col.
Angiglioh, President of Thermal Technologies, Inc. on Feb. 12, 1993, relating to the method in
which the visual image on the screen reflects the amount of heat emanating from the targeted object).
Technically, there are two factors which determine the exact shade of the displayed object: the
amount of heat which the object radiates and the "emissivity" of the object. See Steele, Infrared
Searches, supra note 31, at 24. The "emissivity" of a certain object is its transparency to infrared
emissions. Id. In the same manner in which different amounts of light pass through a window or
curtain, different materials allow different amounts of heat to radiate from them. Id.
57. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (stating that white is
the visual representation of the hot portion of the scale, and black is the visual representation of the
cold portion). The operator must first adjust the controls on the screen so that there is a neutral
starting point which will allow objects radiating different amounts of heat to be visualized. Id.
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provides information which is meaningful only in relative terms.
FLIRs cost anywhere from $15,000, like the ones commonly used by the
police, to over $225,000, like the ones used for more advanced military
purposes.59 They are available in either a small, handheld model' or a more
sophisticated model which is mounted at the bottom of a helicopter.6 Many
courts have emphasized that the FLIR does not emit any rays or beams which
penetrate a particular object but rather that it passively measures the heat which
radiates off the surface of the targeted object.62 While courts are generally in
agreement as to how the FLIR operates, the extent of information which it can
gather from the heat patterns of certain objects has generated far more
dispute.'
B. The FLIR's Capabilities
Generally, courts have conceded that a FLIR can detect differences in heat
on the surfaces of objects.' Beyond this basic consensus, however, the courts
58. See, e.g., Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522 (stating that "hot" and "cold" are relative terms
because a FLIR only provides an image showing which objects are emanating more or less heat than
the normative baseline set by the operator). While the FLIR does not tell its operator the exact
temperature in numerical terms, it is able to differentiate between 0.2 degrees centigrade. See
Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 24.
59. Plaschke, supra note 31, at 607-08 n.4.
60. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522 (describing one particular FLIR as weighing approximately five
pounds and capable of being powered by a portable battery or by a car's cigarette lighter).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
664 (1994) (police employing a FLIR mounted at the bottom of a helicopter to detect heat emanating
from the suspect's roof).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D. Haw. 1991), affid
on other grounds sub. nora. United States v. Feeney, 984 F. 2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993). The Penney-
Feeney court defined the FLIR as "a passive, non-intrusive instrument which detects differences in
temperature on the surface of objects being observed. It does not send any beams or rays into the
area on which it is fixed or in any way penetrate structures within that area." Id. While some
courts have emphasized the passiveness or intrusiveness of a particular device in holding that thermal
surveillance is not a "search," this note argues that these characteristics are not dispositive to the
"search" question. See infra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
63. Compare Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 223 (stating that a FLIR does nothing more than
measure heat emanating from the surface of targeted residences), with United States v. Kyllo, 37
F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994) (entertaining allegations that a FLIR can actually detect sexual
activity inside a person's residence).
64. See, e.g., Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058; United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847, 848 n.3 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994); United States v.
Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1472 (E.D. Wash. 1994); United States v. Deaner, No. 92-0090-
01, 1992 WL 209966, *3 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992), affd on other grounds, 1 F.3d 192 (3rd Cir.
1993); Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 223; State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994). For
purposes other than detecting indoor marijuana cultivation, there seems to be no question that a
FLIR can generically identify certain objects. See United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 509 (9th
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are in complete disagreement as to the precise quality and detail of information
which a FLIR can glean.' While some courts refer to the FLIR as a very
limited and "passive" device,' other courts find the FLIR to be a dangerously
intrusive device, capable of detecting intimate activity within the home.67
However, these concerns exist only in the criminal context; in the non-criminal
context, the FLIR is used for a number of uncontroverted purposes.' When
the government uses thermal surveillance as an investigatory tool, however, a
confusing array of complex fourth amendment issues arise.'
Because the FLIR allows its operator to sense certain infrared light which
is invisible to the naked eye,' it is important to determine the extent of
information which the device can actually disclose.7 Several courts have
engaged in debate over whether the FLIR can actually "see through the walls"
Cir. 1978) (stating that a FLIR could distinguish between a DC-3 and a Lear jet at night).
65. See supra note 63.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (1 lth Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson,
24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United States v. Domtrovich, 852 F.
Supp. 1460 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
68. The military uses thermal surveillance to locate and identify other aircraft in combat
operations. See Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 25. Additionally, researchers use
thermal imagery for geological and oceanic studies as well as to conduct animal censuses. Id.
Public officials are able to conduct rescue missions with the FLIR which is capable of locating a
person in a forest or other dense area. Id. Further, utility companies are taking advantage of the
FLIR's heat-seeking capabilities to detect overloaded wires and to monitor insulation efficiency. Id.
69. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1525-29 (analyzing the split in the federal as well as state courts
over the constitutionality of thermal surveillance). Further, the complexities of FLIR issues have
resulted in a "sizeable contingent" of the courts avoiding the question altogether. Id. at 1525. For
a list of those courts that are split on the issue of whether this type of thermal surveillance is a fourth
amendment "search," see supra notes 13, 14. See supra note 15 for a list of those courts that have
avoided deciding the issue altogether.
70. See Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 24. Steele states that "the FLIR device
allow[s] the police officers to sense a part of the spectrum that their eyes could not normally
perceive in the same way that a geiger counter would have allowed them to tell if radioactive
material was located in the home." Id.
71. This inquiry creates a double-edged sword. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518,
1531 (W.D. Wis. 1994). If the government argues that the FLIR does not glean any specific
information from inside the house, then the information obtained has no evidentiary value in
establishing probable cause. Id. If, however, the government concedes that the FLIR does disclose
specific information taking place within the home, then the use of the FLIR begins to look more like
a fourth amendment "search." See generally Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1981).
In Williams, the court ruled that the government's use of a startron to peer into the defendant's
window for nine straight nights amounted to a fourth amendment "search." Id. at 966. The court,
however, did not hold that the use of a startron would always be a "search" but held that, because
the nine-day surveillance gleaned very specific details about activity within the home, it was a
"search." Id.
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of a particular residence.' The more relevant inquiry, however, does not
concern the FLIR's ability to physically see through walls per se but rather
concerns the type of conclusions which the FLIR allows its operator to draw
regarding the activities inside the home.73 While some government officials are
hesitant to disclose with any amount of particularity what a FLIR can actually
detect,74 courts are considering allegations that a FLIR can detect human
activity in a residence, including sexual activity in the bedroom.75
While the courts will continue to debate the FLIR's precise capabilities
when used for surveillance purposes, some courts have drawn more concrete
conclusions. In one FLIR case, both parties stipulated to the fact that a FLIR
could detect a human form through a window if the person was leaning against
a curtain and that the device could detect a person leaning against a relatively
thin barrier, such as a plywood door.76 Another court indicated that "there is
no doubt" that a FLIR, if properly used, could detect which rooms in the house
were being occupied, whether hot water was being used in the bathroom, or
whether a television or other heat-generating equipment near a window was in
use.' More shocking, however, is the training literature which accompanied
one particular FLIR. It required operators to determine the precise amount of
72. See State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the FLIR
does not "peer" or "intrude" into the curtilage or the home). But see United States v. Field, 855
F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D. Wis. 1994). The court in Field stated that "[a]s for not seeing through
walls, the imager records the heat escaping from the walls that is emitted by an object on the other
side of the wall. To the extent that the device can pick up such radiation and record it, it can 'see
through' walls." Id.
73. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1530. The Field court stated that:
[t]hermal imagers don't see through walls in the sense that a telescope sees through a
window. But the devices provide visual images of varying clarity that allow the
operator to draw, attempt to draw, or claim to draw, conclusions about what is
happening on the other side of the house wall. Id.
See also Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 34 (stating that a FLIR is capable of disclosing
certain activities that occur behind the solid walls of a dwelling).
74. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522 (reporting that Captain Paul Russell of the Wisconsin
National Guard refused to comment on whether a FLIR could actually track the movement of a heat-
radiating object within a structure).
75. See United States v. Kyllo, No. 1994 WL 533802, *4 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1994). In Kyllo,
the court remanded the FLIR issue to the trial court to establish a more concrete factual basis
concerning the degree and detail of information which a FLIR can actually disclose. Id. The Kyllo
court explicitly stated that the trial court needed to determine whether the thermal imager can detect
sexual activity in the bedroom, as an expert for the defendant suggested. Id. See also Field, 855
F. Supp. at 1531 (suggesting that a FLIR can draw accurate conclusions about an individual who
is in his bedroom sipping coffee and watching television when the French doors are open, but the
lightweight curtains are drawn to ensure privacy).
76. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994).
77. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
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coffee in a cup and to identify the tear ducts on a human face.' s Aside from
the courts' extensive debates, one fact seems self-evident: police use the FLIR
on a person's home for the precise purpose of determining what is happening on
the other side of the walls.
C. Detecting Indoor Marijuana Cultivation
Since 1986, when the Supreme Court gave the police a free license to
conduct aerial searches of a person's property, 9 including its curtilage,"
marijuana growers have moved their operations indoors to avoid detection.8'
Consequently, these growers must employ the use of very high intensity
discharge lights to cultivate their crops indoors.' These lights produce an
exorbitant amount of heat which is often vented outside of the growing facility
to obtain the optimum temperature for growing marijuana. 3  This excess or
abnormal amount of heat is detected with the aid of thermal surveillance."
Typically, the police will employ the FLIR to survey a suspect's home
when they have suspicion of illegal marijuana cultivation but not enough
evidence to establish probable cause. 5 A FLIR is most effective late at night
78. See id. See also United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1505 n.14 (10th Cir. 1995)
(stating that it is quite plausible that given the proper circumstances, a FLIR could detect: "the use
of a shower, bath, or hot tub; the running of one's dishwasher or clothes dryer; or the baking of
bread, or a turkey, or cookies.").
79. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (holding that police, flying in a
fixed-wing airplane at 1,000 feet, were not "searching" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when
they obtained visual evidence of the suspect's marijuana crops in his backyard garden). For a more
detailed discussion of the Ciraolo case, see infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
80. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that police, hovering in a helicopter,
were not conducting a fourth amendment "search" when they peered into the suspect's partially
uncovered greenhouse to obtain evidence of marijuana cultivation). For a detailed discussion of the
meaning of "curtilage," see Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968). In general
terms, the "curtilage" is basically the "yard," as distinguished from an open field. See Berner, supra
note 17, at 391.
81. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 224 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[s]uch an
operation is favored by indoor marijuana growers because it is not dependent on weather conditions
and cannot be detected by the naked eye").
82. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir.), cell. denied, 115 S. Ct.
664 (1994).
83. See id. at 1057-58 (noting that these types of lights produce temperatures upwards of 150
degrees and that the optimum growing temperature for marijuana is between 68 and 72 degrees).
84. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1521-23 (W.D. Wis. 1994); Steele, Infrared
Searches, supra note 31, at 24-25; Plaschke, supra note 31, at 607-08, 607 nn.2, 4.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that the
police employed a FLIR for use on the defendant's residence after learning that the defendant had
purchased a large amount of indoor growing supplies and after recovering certain items from the
defendant's trash which were indicative of marijuana cultivation); United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d
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or early in the morning when all of the solar energy has dissipated from the
targeted object.s" Generally, the operator must approach the residence within
twenty to 200 meters and must be in a direct line of sight with the targeted
object.' The police look for "hot spots," which are located by either
comparing heat patterns from one part of the structure with other parts of the
structure or by comparing the suspect's home with other homes in the
neighborhood.' The difficulty, however, in differentiating between "hot
spots" created by marijuana cultivation and "hot spots" resulting from other
types of heat-generating activity" has led to a number of improperly issued
search warrants. 9
When a court rules that a certain police activity is not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it has, in effect, placed that activity outside
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.9' Consequently, when a court holds
that the use of a FLIR is not a "search," it allows the police to use the
instrument indiscriminately without calling the reasonableness standard of the
1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving the government's use of a FLIR on the defendant's shed after
complaints from neighbors and after the police allegedly smelled a marijuana-like odor emanating
from the shed).
86. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522. Operating a FLIR during these times makes it more likely
that any detected heat is the result of some type of activity within the home rather than any of the
day's remaining solar heat. Id.
87. Id. at 1522 n.2 (stating that the FLIR must be in a position which allows it to be free from
any barriers which would interfere with the detection of heat emanating from the object to be
viewed).
88. For instances when the police compared FLIR readings from the suspect's residence with
readings from other residences in the same neighborhood, see, e.g., United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d
192, 195 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
89. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531-32 (W.D. Wis. 1994). The Field court
argued that there seem to be no clearly established guidelines that the police may follow to
differentiate between heat produced by indoor marijuana growing operations and heat produced by
any other type of activity within the home. Id.
90. See Tim Bryant, DEA Targets Indoor Pot Growers, ST. L. POST., May 9, 1993, at ID.
91. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) (holding that the police
were not "searching" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when they rummaged through the
defendant's trash which he left on the side of the curb); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15
(1986) (holding that the government was not conducting a fourth amendment "search" when officers
flew over the defendant's property in an airplane and obtained evidence that the defendant was
illegally growing marijuana in his backyard); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239
(1986) (deciding that aerial photography of a chemical company's industrial complex was not a
.search" under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding
that the police's utilization of trained narcotics detection dogs on the defendant's luggage was not
a "search"); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (stating that the government's
monitoring of a beeper which was placed in a container being transported by the defendant in his
car was not a "search"); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that the
government's use of a pen register to obtain a list of all of the phone numbers called from the
suspect's home did not amount to a fourth amendment "search").
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Fourth Amendment into question.' The Supreme Court's current standard for
this initial, yet very pivotal question of whether a certain governmental activity
is a search, was articulated in Katz v. United States. 93 To fully understand the
Katz standard and its limitations when applied to highly sophisticated devices
like the FLIR, an analysis of the actual decision, its historical background, and
its subsequent applications is required.'
III. KAz v. UMTED STAES: 95 THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRJVACY STANDARD
The 1967 Katz decision is a milestone in the history of the Supreme Court's
fourth amendment jurisprudence.' Dubbed as the Court's landmark "search"
decision,' 7 Katz established the principle that a "search" occurs only when the
government intrudes on an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."9
92. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664
(1994) (cutting off fourth amendment discussion when the court determined that the police's use of
a FLIR did not constitute a "search"). When a court holds that a certain governmental activity is
not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it closes fourth amendment debate
altogether. See Berner, supra note 17, at 385. The police may act as unreasonably as they please
because as long as they are not "searching," they remain "invisible" to the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 390.
93. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
94. Typically, fourth amendment critics identify Katz's problematic nature by analyzing the
actual decision as well as its history and applications. See generally Berner, supra note 17, at 385-
97 (arguing that Katz "asks the wrong questions" by critically analyzing its history and subsequent
applications); Lisa J. Steele, The View from on High: Satellite Remote Sensing Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 317, 322-26 (1991) [hereinafter Steele, Remote Sensing]
(discussing the historical overview of the Katz decision and its application in the "open view" cases
to present the standard's inability to effectively scrutinize the use of satellite imagery); Katz, Twenty-
first Century, supra note 17, at 555-75 (analyzing the Katz decision, its history, and its applications
to put forth the argument that the courts are slowly eroding vital fourth amendment rights);
Gutterman, supra note 34, at 651-77 (extensively outlining Katz and its progeny to demonstrate that
the Supreme Court's current "search" standard fails to protect true privacy rights and permits their
gradual decay as new surveillance technology is developed).
95. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
96. See Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment
Protection, 73 MINN. L. REv. 583, 592 (1989). Professor Serr states that the Katz holding radically
changed forever the focus of fourth amendment jurisprudence. Id. Katz transformed the nature of
a "search" from a literal interpretation of the term, concerned with physically searching in a
constitutionally-protected area, to a more broad interpretation, concerned with intrusions upon an.
individual's expectation of privacy. Id.
97. See supra note 23.
98. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Defining what actually makes up one's
reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice Harlan created a test consisting of two prongs, both of
which must be met for a given governmental activity to constitute a "search" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. First, the person must exhibit an actual, or subjective expectation of
privacy, and second, society must objectively be prepared to recognize that expectation as
reasonable. Id.
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This Note argues that the Katz test is inherently limited to only those instances
where the individual is actually given a chance to form such an expectation of
privacy.' Further, this Note adopts the position that the post-Katz cases have
actually mutated the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in their attempts
to apply the standard to different situations, making it more difficult to realize
Katz's true limitations.1'0 As a result, courts are applying Katz to the
government's use of the FLIR when such an application is unfair, illogical, and
beyond the scope of the Katz standard itself.'"' To understand this problem
fully, it is necessary to examine the historical development of the Katz
decision," 2 the actual decision with its inherent limitations, °3 and the
decision's subsequent applications. 0 4
A. The Development of the Katz Standard
It is generally accepted that the Fourth Amendment stems from a series of
events following the American Revolution, particularly the colonial protest
against the writs of assistance and the British rejection of general warrants."°'
These practices were particularly oppressive and led to vigorous protests and
litigation because they allowed the government to physically trespass on and
rummage through a person's property and belongings."°6 This movement
99. See infra notes 133-46 and accompanying text. See also section VI.A.
100. See infra notes 147-207 and accompanying text. See also Katz, Twenty-first Century,
supra note 17, at 563-75 (discussing the transformation of the Katz standard by subsequent "search"
decisions). Professor Katz argues that the Supreme Court has seized upon a specific exception
expressed in Katz and has used it to contort the "privacy-based standard into a trivialized risk
assessment analysis." Id. at 563. He further states that anomalous doctrines, like the risk
assessment doctrine, erode core fourth amendment values and operate to distort the true principles
advanced in the actual Katz decision. Id. at 569.
101. See infra notes 208-55 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 147-207 and accompanying text.
105. See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-20
(1966). Writs of assistance were judicial orders which authorized officers of the Crown to enter and
search buildings for smuggled goods. Id. at 31-32. General warrants were basically employed to
enforce seditious libel laws by granting royal officers the power to search out and seize writings
which were critical of the Crown. Id. at 21.
106. See id. at 31 (stating that writs of assistance and general warrants were oppressivebecause
they neither required prior identification nor description of the place to be searched or the items to
be seized). For a detailed analysis of the history of litigation stemming from the writs of assistance
and the general warrants, see Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meaning of
"Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOwA L. REV. 541, 553-57
(1988).
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proved to be the driving force behind the Framers' drafting of the Fourth
Amendment. 07
While blatant physical intrusions by the government initiated the "right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,"" the Supreme Court's first
major fourth amendment case, Boyd v. United States," did not involve a
physical trespass at all."' The Boyd Court held that a federal statute which
107. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886) (stating that an analysis
of the practices of writs of assistance and general warrants sheds light on the nature of the
proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment). See also Cunningham, supra note 106, at 553-57.
Professor Cunningham identifies two cases in particular which he feels had a direct impact on the
drafting of the Fourth Amendment. Id. In 1761, Paxton's case involved the granting of a writ of
assistance in which John Adams took down this famous passage made by James Otis in the
courtroom:
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the freedom of one's
house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a
prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate
this privilege. Custom house officers may enter our houses when they please - we are
commended to permit their entry - their menial servants may enter - break locks, bars
and every thing in their way - and whether they break through malice or revenge, no
man, no court can inquire - bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.
Id. at 553-54 (quoting from LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 113, 142 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds.
1965)).
The second important case involved the issuance of a general warrant by Lord Halifax, the
British Secretary of State, in 1762, under which four messengers in three days searched 49 persons
for a libelous publishing. Id. at 556. John Wilkes, who was found to be the author of the
publishing, obtained a verdict against Lord Halifax. Id. (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's
State Trials 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765)).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 9 for the text of the Fourth Amendment. Prior
to Katz, a physical trespass upon a property interest was a prerequisite to attachment of fourth
amendment rights. See Katz, Twenty-flrst Century, supra note 17, at 556. For examples of cases
which apply the physical trespass standard, see Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
109. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
110. Id. at 619-20. In Boyd, the issue concerned the constitutionality of a federal statute which
provided that in certain non-criminal cases, the court may require the production of any business
record or invoice which the government asserted would help prove a certain allegation. Id. The
Boyd Court was called to answer the following inquiry:
Is a search and seizure, or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory production of a
man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him in a proceeding to forfeit his
property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws-is such a proceeding for such a
purpose an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment of the Constitution?
Id. at 622.
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required the production of certain papers violated the Fourth Amendment."'
The Court's liberal construction of the Fourth Amendment was short lived,
however, as it later decided a series of cases which required the existence of an
actual physical trespass before the Fourth Amendment could be triggered."
2
In Olmstead v. United States,"' the Court retreated from its holding in
Boyd by deciding that wire-tapping a telephone and listening to one's private
telephone conversations 4 did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment. " 5  The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment is only
concerned with blatant physical intrusions rather than the mere interception of
telephone conversations."'
111. Id. at 630. The Court stated that "the breaking of... doors" and "runmmaging of
... drawers" are not essential to violate the Fourth Amendment, but rather it is "the invasion of
[one's] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property" which calls
the Fourth Amendment into question. Id. The Boyd Court went into a lengthy discussion of the
great controversies surrounding the traditional writs of assistance and general search warrants. Id.
at 624-30. The Court then went on to acknowledge that it was not the existence of a physical
trespass which made these practices so despicable, but rather it was the invasion of a person's
"indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property." Id. at 630. The
Court held that the Fourth Amendment sought to prohibit acts of arbitrary power and that compelling
a person to produce incriminating papers without cause was simply an insidious disguise of an old
grievance which had previously been so deeply abhorred. Id.
112. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that the
interception of telegraph messages by the police did not constitute a fourth amendment search
because oral communications were not the type of tangible things which the Fourth Amendment
sought to protect); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (holding that the police were not
searching when they entered the defendant's open field to obtain evidence because the Fourth
Amendment protects only the home and the area immediately surrounding it).
113. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
114. The defendants were charged with conspiring to violate a series of laws dealing with
intoxicating liquors set out in the National Prohibition Act. Id. at 455. The information which led
to these charges was obtained by the intercepting of messages from the residences of four of the
defendants. Id. at 456-57. Four federal probation officers inserted the wire taps into the telephone
wires without trespassing onto the property of any of the defendants. Id. at 457.
115. Id. at 464. The Obwntead Court decided that telephone conversations were not the tangible
kinds of things with which the Fourth Amendment was concerned. Id. The Court argued that "[tihe
amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers,
or his effects." Id.
116. Id. at 463-66. The Court in Otmstead analyzed the historical importance of the writs of
assistance and the general warrants much more narrowly than did the Court in Boyd. Id. at 463.
The Court reasoned that those historical practices concerned governmental misuse of authority only
with respect to physical, tangible items. Id. The Fourth Amendment, the Court argued, was drafted
to protect individuals' privacy interests only in regards to those physical items that the amendment
expressly delineated: one's person, house, papers, and effects. Id. Applying this principle to the
case at hand, the Court asserted that:
The United States takes no such care of telegraph or telephone messages as of mailed
sealed letters. The amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
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This trespass-oriented standard became even more narrowly construed in
Hester v. United States."7 The Hester Court applied the strict, literal meaning
of the language of the Fourth Amendment in holding that even a governmental
trespass on one's open field did not constitute a "search" because the
amendment protects only the person and the home."' This holding expressed
the Court's willingness to embrace a "protected areas" theory in testing the
Fourth Amendment's limits." 9  Thus, at this point in the Court's historical
development of the Fourth Amendment, only a physical trespass in a narrowly-
defined list of places would constitute a "search" and be subject to fourth
amendment scrutiny."n This notion survived until 1967 when the Court
decided its seminal fourth amendment "search" case, Katz v. United States.!2'
B. The Katz Decision and its Limitations
In Katz, the defendant was making a phone call in a public telephone booth
to allegedly engage in an illegal wagering transaction. " Suspecting foul play,
FBI agents placed an electronic recording device on the outside of the booth to
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.
Id.
117. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, revenue officers entered the defendant's land without a
search warrant and positioned themselves some 50 to 100 yards away from his home. Id. at 58.
From this vantage point, the officers saw Hester come out of his home carrying what appeared to
be a jug of whisky. Id. They eventually arrested the defendant, confirming that the jug contained
illegal moonshine, and charged him with various liquor offenses. Id. at 57.
118. Id. at 58. The defendant challenged the officers' conduct, arguing that their warrantless
entry upon his land constituted an unreasonable "search" under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Rejecting the defendant's argument that the police had illegally obtained the evidence without a
search warrant, the Court held that the officers' conduct did not amount to a "search" because they
had only entered upon the defendant's open field. Id. at 58-59. The Court stated that "the special
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and
effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as
old as common law." Id at 59.
119. See Gutterman, supra note 34, at 660-62 (stating that Hester is the seminal decision which
advanced the "constitutionally protected areas" type of analysis).
120. See id. at 661. Professor Gutterman states that the twin principles of Hester and Obnstead
established the standard that a "search" occurred only when the government physically trespassed
onto a constitutionally protected area. Id. See also Berner, supra note 17, at 385-86. Professor
Berner summarizes the Court's "search" doctrine prior to 1967 as a two-part test. Id. First, the
"place," typified by Hester, must be of the type which the Fourth Amendment is concerned with;
and, second, the "type of government activity," typified by Obnstead, must be of the type which
the amendment was intended to scrutinize. Id. In a nutshell, Professor Berner states that "until
1967, there was no fourth-amendment debate until the police trespassed into a relatively short list
of 'protected places.'" Id. For a list of places that triggered fourth amendment scrutiny prior to
1967, see id. at 386 n.ll.
121. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Berner, supra note 17, at 385-86 (stating that the Katz decision
in 1967 brought an end to the Court's twin trespass doctrine established in Olmstead and Hester).
122. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
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record the defendant's conversation and to obtain evidence to indict the
defendant on federal gambling charges.in Although both parties tailored their
respective arguments to fit the Court's standard as set forth in Obnstead and
Hester,"2 the Court decided to forgo its traditional trespass requirement and
adopt a new standard for defining a "search" under the Fourth Amendment." s
The Court stated that what a person seeks to keep private is afforded fourth
amendment protection, but those things that a person knowingly exposes to the
public are not entitled to such protection.'2
Thus, even though the agents did not physically trespass into a traditionally
protected area, the Court still held that they were "searching" for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment and had obtained information illegally without first
123. Id. Because the FBI agents had placed the recording device on the outside of the booth,
there was no physical invasion into the area occupied by the defendant. Id. at 348-49. The agents
used this information to indict Mr. Katz on eight separate counts of violating a federal statute which
prohibited the transmitting of wagering information by telephone. Id. at 348.
124. For a discussion of the Court's traditional "search" standard set forth in Hester and
Olmstead, see supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text. The attorneys' arguments in Katz
focussed on whether the electronic recording device constituted an actual trespass into the booth and
whether a phone booth was the kind of "protected place" which the Fourth Amendment was meant
to scrutinize. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-51.
125. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). First, the Court rejected the notion that
the Fourth Amendment applies only to an exclusive list of "protected places." Id. The Court
reasoned that just because the defendant was in a public telephone booth and not in a traditional
"protected place," he did not "shed" his fourth amendment rights. Id. at 352. The Katz Court
argued that:
[olne who occupies [a public telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the
toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcasted to the world. To read the Constitution more
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.
Id.
The Court went on to acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment "protects people-and not
simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 353. Thus, the Court's first
major proposition in Katz was that fourth amendment analysis must focus on "people" rather than
"places." Id. Having gone that far, the Court found that it had to extend its holding one step
further to abolish its traditional trespass requirement. Id. (overruling the trespass requirement which
the Court had established in Onstead).
Thus, as a second major effect of the holding in Katz, the Court effectively overturned its prior
ruling in Obnstead which held that the Fourth Amendment only protects against physical trespasses.
Id. (stating that the underpinnings of the OLnstead decision have Become so eroded by subsequent
decisions that the traditional "trespass" requirement is no longer a constitutionally-sound doctrine).
The Court stated that the petitioner's privacy in his phone conversations which he justifiably relied
upon was violated regardless of the absence of a physical trespass into the telephone booth. Id.
126. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
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securing a search warrant."n While the majority took a radical new approach
to the fourth amendment "search" issue, it is the language found in Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion which emerged as the foundation for the Katz
formula as it exists today."~
In what was to become the core language in fourth amendment "search"
jurisprudence, Justice Harlan interpreted the majority's holding to represent that
a person is entitled to fourth amendment protection wherever that person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy."n Justice Harlan broke his "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test into two parts: 1) a person must exhibit an actual,
or subjective, expectation of privacy; 3° and 2) society must objectively be
prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.' Rejecting the
traditional formalistic approach, Justice Harlan adopted a value-oriented
127. Id. at 353. The Court held that:
[t]he Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not
happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
129. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan's refinement of the "search" test set forth by the majority in Katz quickly became the
prevailing view. See Serf, supra note 96, at 593. Justice Harlan's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test has been consistently applied as the functional Katz search standard. See, e.g.,
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,211 (1986);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81
(1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
130. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. By first establishing a subjective prong to one's expectation
of privacy, Justice Harlan required that individuals actually take affirmative steps to "exhibit" their
intentions to keep things to themselves. Id. For a critical analysis of the subjective prong of Justice
Harlan's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, see Gutterman, supra note 34, at 665-67.
131. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. Justice Harlan adopted the objective prong to his test to ensure
that all expectations of privacy be reasonable. Id. He stated that if a person exposes something to
the "plain view" of outsiders, that person cannot claim fourth amendment protection by merely
asserting a subjective expectation of privacy. Id. The objective analysis serves as a check to ensure
that any alleged subjective expectation of privacy is reasonable. Id.
Applying these principles to the facts in Katz, the defendant was found to have reasonably
expected that his telephone conversations were not being surreptitiously recorded by the police. Id.
at 352-53. Mr. Katz exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy by occupying the booth, shutting
the door behind him, and paying the toll permitting him to place a call. Id. at 352. Further, it was
objectively reasonable for Mr. Katz to assume that his conversation was not being intercepted by the
police. Id. As such, the warrantless use of the recording device was deemed a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence obtained from it was held inadmissible. Id. at 352-53, 360-
61. For further discussion of the objective prong to Justice Harlan's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test, see Gutterman, supra note 34, at 662-65.
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approach which focuses on an individual's true privacy interests within the
context of a social dynamic."
While the Katz decision greatly broadened the scope of government activity
which constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment,' the standard is
not without its limitations." Because the Katz standard requires the
individual to form an expectation of privacy in certain activities and to actively
take steps to ensure this privacy, the standard is inherently limited to those
instances where an individual is given the occasion, or chance, to form such an
expectation. '3 In Katz,'36 for example, telephone conversations were an
ordinary, commonplace activity in society in 1967.137 Through his common
societal experiences, Mr. Katz was aware that public telephone conversations
could be overheard by the ordinary passerby, and he guarded against such an
132. See Gutterman, supra note 34, at 662-67 (summarizing the effect of the Katz decision).
Professor Gutterman states that:
[t]his view of the fourth amendment was intended to escape the structure of a formalistic
property analysis and to affirm the concept that the amendment protects certain privacy
rights. The Katz Court explicitly eliminated the trespass requirements, implicitly
rejected the constitutionally protected areas standard, and decided that Katz had a right
to expect his conversation on this public telephone would remain private. . . . The right
of the individual to be left alone to live his daily life secure against arbitrary invasions
by governmental officials appeared once again to become the basic value protected by
the fourth amendment.
Id. at 663.
133. See id. at 662-65; Katz, Twenty-first Century, supra note 17, at 557. Professor Katz
argues that the Katz decision's expansion of fourth amendment coverage was sound for two reasons.
Id. First, he argues that the decision is consistent with the actual language of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. Second, he states that this expansion is supported by social and economic changes.
Id.
134. This note argues that Katz's "expectation of privacy" test should only be applied in those
instances where it is fair and logical to require an individual to form such an expectation. See Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (requiring an individual to form an actual expectation
of privacy before invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment). This note argues that Katz's
limitations prohibit its application to devices or methods of surveillance which are uncommon to a
certain community. See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text. See also infra section VI.A.
135. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 363 (stating that if an individual fails to form an expectation of
privacy, she has waived her fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures). This note argues that a person is only able to take the active step of forming an
expectation in those instances where her societal experience has given her the occasion to form an
expectation of privacy. This note proposes an "extraordinary device" exception which would allow
the courts to forgo a Katz analysis in those instances where a person was never afforded the
opportunity to actively form an expectation of privacy. See infra section VI.A.
136. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a discussion of the Katz decision, see supra notes 122-32 and
accompanying text.
137. See id, at 361 (stating that it is the societal norm to enter a telephone booth, shut the door
behind you, and reasonably assume that your conversation will be kept private).
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interception by placing his call M a closed telephone booth. 13' Through his
societal experiences, Mr. Katz was given a reason, or chance, to form an
expectation of privacy in his phone calls, and he actively chose to safeguard this
privacy interest. 139 Thus, it is both fair and logical to require that Mr. Katz
form an expectation of privacy in his phone conversations and, further, that he
objectively exhibit this expectation."O
Now, compare the Katz fact pattern14' to the following hypothetical:
Suppose that the government, in 1996, developed a new high-tech
device which could measure precise sound wave patterns in one's
voice, and with these measurements, the device could inform its user
of the exact number and nature of illegal acts which the speaker has
previously engaged in. Further, suppose that the government
indiscriminately phoned people in the community, pretending to be a
common solicitor, and used the device to obtain this very damaging
evidence, secure arrest warrants, and finally to indict those people
with sufficient criminal histories.
The difference between the governmental activity in the hypothetical and
that in Katz42 is subtle, yet crucial. It is a fundamental principle in society
that if one does not want others to hear the content of a conversation,
appropriate steps can be taken to help assure a certain degree of privacy.1 43
It is thus fair and logical to speak in terms of an "expectation of privacy" in this
instance. The high-tech scrutiny of voice wave patterns, on the other hand, does
not commonly exist in society, and while individuals have reason to consciously
monitor the content of their speech, they were never given reason to monitor the
sound wave patterns of their voice. It is unfair and illogical to even speak in
terms of an "expectation of privacy" in regards to the sound wave patterns of
one's voice. The dynamic relationship between society and the individual, that
138. Id. at 352, 361 (stating that Mr. Katz made his phone calls from a closed public telephone
booth).
139. See id. Mr. Katz, like any member of his community, knew that he would have to make
his phone call in an area which enabled him to exclude the uninvited ear of a passerby. Mr. Katz's
dealings with society put him on notice that if he wanted to keep his telephone conversations private,
he would have to actively take steps to seclude himself from the hearing distance of others. Id.
140. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of the facts in Katz, see supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
142. The FBI agents in Katz placed an electronic recording device on the outside of a public
telephone booth to record the substance of the defendant's telephone conversions. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967); See also supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
143. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. Mr. Katz was able to take the appropriate steps to ensure
privacy in his telephone conversations by entering a telephone booth and shutting the door behind
him. Id.
Smith: Thermal Surveillance and the Extraordinary Device Exception: Re-D
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996
1094 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
by which the Katz formula is inherently bound, does not afford the individual
an occasion to develop such an expectation.'" Thus, Katz's limitations
preclude its application to situations where an individual was never given
occasion to develop an expectation of privacy in the first place.145 The true
problem, however, is not the fact that the Katz standard is limited in its
application; rather, the problem lies in the Court's subsequent mutations of the
Katz formula in which the true spirit of Katz and its limitations are not
realized.'4
IV. MISAPPLICATIONS OF THE KA7Z STANDARD
Since 1967, the Court has applied the Katz "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard to a wide variety of situations in determining whether certain
types of governmental activities constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment.' 47 In its attempts, however, the Court has strayed from the
144. See generally Gutterman, supra note 34, at 700-07 (discussing the government's use of
electronic monitoring equipment (a beeper) to track persons in their automobiles). Professor
Gutterman explains that when we travel in an automobile on the public roads, we anticipate that
others may observe us as we move from place to place. Id. at 701. He states that the fact that
observation may be accomplished by ordinary, visual surveillance does not allow the courts to extend
this principle to the government's use of high-tech, electronic surveillance equipment. Id. This type
of monitoring goes far beyond the "ordinary" powers of observation and ought not be allowed in
a free society. Id. See also United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976)
(stating that surveillance techniques which extend beyond the normal powers of observation should
not be extended to law enforcement personnel in a free society).
145. See supra note 144. For a discussion of a proposed "extraordinary device exception"
which would prohibit applying Katz to situations in which it would be unfair and illogical, see infra
notes 256-76 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 152-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's application
of the Katz doctrine. See also Gutterman, supra note 34, at 667 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
application of Katz has led to results which undercut Katz's promise); Jon E. Lemole, From Katz
to Greenwood: Abandonment Gets Recycled from the Trash Pile - Can Our Garbage Be Saved
from the Court's Rummaging Hands?, 41 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 583 (1991) (stating that the
Court has misapplied the Katz doctrine in its later decisions by contending that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in something voluntarily conveyed to a third party); Serr, supra note 96, at
598 (asserting that the Supreme Court's application of the Katz standard has greatly limited the scope
of the Fourth Amendment); Katz, Twenty-first Century, supra note 17, at 554 (arguing that in the
decades since the Court decided Katz, it has applied the doctrine to reduce rather than enhance the
protections of the Fourth Amendment). Professor Katz further adds that the "Katz standard has been
twisted to allow the government access to many intimate details about our lives without having to
establish the reasonableness of its behavior.' Id.
147. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (deciding whether the aerial surveillance
of the government over the defendant's greenhouse constituted a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (deciding whether police officers were
"searching" when they entered the defendant's "open field" and used a flashlight to peer into his
barn); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (deciding whether the government
intruded on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy when police officers flew over his
industrial complex and used a very sophisticated mapping camera to take photographs); California
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actual Katz standard and has created a number of sub-doctrines which mask the
true spirit of Katz." More importantly, however, is that these sub-doctrines
render Katz's limitations, discussed in the previous section, 9 more difficult
to realize. " An analysis of the Court's post-Katz cases is necessary to
understand this phenomena which lies at the core of the courts' difficulties in
deciding the FLIR issue.'
A. The Plain View Doctrine
In plain, unambiguous language, the Court in Katz stated that fourth
amendment protection was to attach to the person and not to a particular list of
places."5 2 This fundamental tenet of the Katz decision was overlooked when
the Court resurrected its traditional "open field" doctrine in Oliver v. United
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (deciding whether the police officers' conduct amounted to a
"search" when they flew over the defendant's home and spotted marijuana growing in his backyard);
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (deciding whether the police officers invaded the
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy by attaching a beeper to contraband which the
defendant eventually took into his home); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (deciding
whether the electronic monitoring of the defendant in his automobile amounted to a "search" under
the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (deciding whether the
government's use of narcotics dogs to sniff the defendant's luggage violated his reasonable
expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (deciding whether the
government's installation of a pen register device to record the telephone numbers dialed from the
defendant's telephone constituted a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (deciding whether the warrantless electronic eavesdropping by
government agents by means of a transmitter which an informer consented to wear during meetings
with the defendant violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy).
148. See Berner, supra note 17, at 394-97 (arguing that the Court has created several sub-
doctrines to the Katz formula which are not representative of true fourth amendment rights);
Gutterman, supra note 34, at 667-707 (discussing the erosion of the Katz doctrine as a result of the
Supreme Court's adoption of several "search" theories which seem to retreat from the true meaning
of the Katz decision). For a discussion of the "plain view" doctrine, see infra notes 152-64 and
accompanying text. See infra notes 165-94 and accompanying text for an analysis of the Court's
creation of the "risk of exposure" theory. The "intimate activities" doctrine is discussed infra notes
195-203 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of the inherent limitations of Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard, see supra notes 133-46 and accompanying text.
150. By creating separate doctrines and theories within the Katz analysis, the Court has turned
its focus away from the actual "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard. In so doing, Katz's
inability to effectively analyze those governmental surveillance techniques not common to society
has gone unacknowledged.
151. For a list of those courts split on the issue of whether the warrantless use of a FLIR on
a person's home is a fourth amendment "search," see supra notes 13-15. For a discussion of the
different holdings in the FLIR cases, see infra notes 219-53 and accompanying text.
152. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (stating that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people, not places"). For a more in-depth discussion of the Katz decision, see supra notes
122-32 and accompanying text.
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States. '3 The Oliver Court established the blanket rule that any police activity
conducted in an open field, however unreasonable, is not a "search" for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. " The Court reasoned that because an
open field is in "plain view," it does not provide the setting for the type of
intimate activities which the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect. 55
Such a broad decision is a generic application of the Katz standard, one in which
the Court chose to rubber stamp the issue rather than examine the defendant's
true expectations of privacy. " The extent to which the Court was willing to
extend the "plain view" doctrine was illustrated in United States v. Dunn. '57
In Dunn, DEA agents entered the defendant's "open field" without a search
warrant to determine if he was producing illegal drugs in his barn.'" To
153. 466 U.s. 170, 183 (1984) (holding that police officers were not "searching" when they
entered the defendant's "open fields" without a search warrant and discovered marijuana). See Serr,.
supra note 96, at 605-06 (stating that the Court in Oliver reverted back to the pre-Kaz construction
of the Fourth Amendment as only protecting against an actual physical trespass onto a specific list
of constitutionally protected areas).
In Oliver, narcotics agents received a tip that Mr. Oliver was growing marijuana on his farm.
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173. Without a warrant, the agents entered Oliver's land by driving past
Oliver's home to a locked gate marked with a "No Trespassing" sign. Id. at 173 n.1. The agents
walked around the gate and searched Oliver's land, eventually finding a field of marijuana about one
mile from his home. Id. at 173.
154. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. The Court held, essentially, that any privately-owned property
outside of the home and the yard is an "open field" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and is
not entitled to protection, including a heavily forested area. Id. at 180 n.ll.
155. Id. at 176-77. The Court stated that "the government's intrusion upon the open fields is
not one of those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
177. The Court construed the text of the Fourth Amendment strictly and argued that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect people in their "'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' [but] is not
extended to open fields." Id. at 176.
156. See Serr, supra note 96, at 607 (stating that the Oliver Court justified its holding by
belittling across the board a person's privacy interest in open fields); Gutterman, supra note 34, at
689 (stating that it is commonplace for individuals to expect that their privately-owned woods and
fields which they protect from public view are entitled to some measure of privacy). Professor
Gutterman further notes that society does acknowledge this privacy interest, but it is the court, in
its war against narcotics, which has deemed this privacy interest not essential. Id.
157. 480 U.S. 296, 296-97 (1987).
158. Id. at 294. The DEA agents first noticed that a particular individual was buying large
amounts of chemicals and equipment used to make controlled substances. Id. at 296. The agents
then placed electronic monitoring devices in some of the equipment, which led them to the
defendant's ranch. Id. See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding
that use of electronic monitoring equipment by police officers to track an individual in his
automobile did not amount to a "search" under the Fourth Amendment). The agents then took aerial
photographs of the defendant's ranch and the surrounding area. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297. See
generally California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (ruling that aerial surveillance of a
person's home and surrounding area did not constitute a fourth amendment "search"). It was at this
point that the agents made their way onto the defendant's property without a search warrant. Dunn,
480 U.S. at 297.
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reach their vantage point, the agents traveled a half-mile off of a public road,
crossed over the farm's perimeter fence, crossed over several barbed wired and
wooden fences, made their way under the eaves of the defendant's barn, and
used a flashlight to see through fishnetting into the barn-. The Court
reasoned that because the DEA agents had only entered the defendant's "open
field" and had observed only what was in "plain view," they were not
"searching" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
In addition to Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent in Dunn,"" the decision
has been criticized for applying the once-rejected "open fields" doctrine'6 in
conjunction with the "plain view" doctrine to reach a conclusion that gives little
regard to property owners' true privacy interests." As the Court
159. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297-98. The agents observed what they suspected to be a drug
laboratory within the defendant's barn and returned twice the following day to confirm the
laboratory's presence. Id. at 298. With this information, the agents obtained a search warrant,
arrested the defendant, and charged him with conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance and
related offenses. Id. at 298-99.
160. Id. at 304. The Court noted that the police officers never entered the defendant's barn but
rather had remained on the defendant's "open field" the entire time. Id. The Court held that from
this constitutional vantage point, the officers "merely stood, outside the curtilage of the house and
in the open fields upon which the barn was constructed, and peered into the barn's open front." Id.
The Court found that the activity within the barn was in "plain view" of the agents. Id. Reverting
back to the notion of the Fourth Amendment only protecting against a physical trespass on a specific
list of protected places, discussed at supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text, the Court held that
"standing as they were in the open fields, the Constitution did not forbid them to observe the
phenylacetone laboratory located in respondent's barn." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304.
161. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan argued that the Court's holding gave no consideration to either the individual's sense of
security or the individual's true.privacy interests. Id. at 319. He stated that the majority's decision
to allow this type of police activity negatively affected an individual's fourth amendment privacy
interests in two ways: first, the individual's sense of security is put into jeopardy; and second, those
who wish to safeguard their privacy interests are burdened too heavily. Id. Professor Amsterdam
addressed these types of effects when he stated that "[t]he question is not whether you or I must
draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to
draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance." See Amsterdam, supra
note 17, at 403.
162. The Katz decision appeared to explicitly reject the notion that the Fourth Amendment is
concerned with a list of "protected places." See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
(stating that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."). See also supra note 125.
163. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 34, at 688-94. Professor Gutterman notes that the effect
of the Court's holding in Dunn is to give law enforcement officers the "unrestricted power to engage
anytime in surveillance of private property in open fields, for as long as they want, with as much
personnel and equipment as desired." Id. at 694. He further argues that the Dunn holding
"violently distorts" the English language, strikes at the "heart of the meaning of security and
privacy," and does the Fourth Amendment a "great injustice." Id. at 693.
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incorporated additional doctrines into its "search" analysis, it continued to
retreat from the spirit of the Katz decision."
B. The Risk of Exposure Doarine
In an attempt to conceptualize its "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard, the Court in Katz stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment
protection."" In subsequent search decisions, however, the Court has treated
this language as an independent rule rather than as a means to understanding the
true spirit of the Katz analysis and has used it in creating a "risk of exposure"
doctrine which escapes a true application of the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard."s The following cases illustrate the general thrust of the
doctrine, which generally purports that a person is not entitled to fourth
amendment protection in a certain activity or thing if that person merely risks
exposing that activity or thing to the general public. 67
164. See infra notes 165-203 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's utilization of the
"risk of exposure" doctrine and the "intimate activities" argument).
165. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
166. See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 384. Professor Amsterdam argues that reducing the
Katz doctrine to principles of risk-taking escapes the true meaning of Katz and leaves one's privacy
rights completely in the hands of the government. Id. Professor Amsterdam further states that "the
government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing
half-hourly on television that 1984 [by George Orwell] was being advanced by a decade and that we
were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance." Id. See also
Gutterman, supra note 34, at 667-75. Gutterman argues that the Court's adoption of the "risk of
exposure" doctrine radically altered the promise of the Katz decision and greatly reduced the Fourth
Amendment's scope of protection. Id. at 670.
167. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989) (deciding that law enforcement
officers did not "search" the defendant's greenhouse which was missing a ceiling panel when they
flew over the structure and observed a marijuana growing operation because this activity was subject
to observation by the general flying public); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986)
(holding that because the defendant risked exposing his marijuana garden to the general flying
public, police officers were not "searching" when they flew over his property and observed the
growing crops); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-42 (1988) (holding that the defendant
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in curbside garbage left for pickup because he
risked exposing the contents of the garbage to snoops, animals, and mischievous children); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (ruling that the defendant traveling in an automobile
had no expectation of privacy in his movements because he voluntarily conveyed his movements to
anyone who wanted to look); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979) (holding that the
defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers which he dialed by
risking their exposure to the telephone company).
This note argues that the Court's adoption of such a doctrine within its analysis of Katz
deflects attention away from the actual Katz analysis. Critics, however, have attacked the "risk of
exposure" doctrine directly as a completely misplaced application of fourth amendment
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 406. Professor Amsterdam argues that
"[tlhe fact that our ordinary social intercourse, uncontrolled by government, imposes certain risks
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In both California v. Ciraolo' and Florida v. Riley, " the police
engaged in an aerial surveillance of property suspected of harboring illegal
activity. t" In each case, the police were acting upon an informant's tip that
the homeowner was growing marijuana."7 ' The Court held that in both cases
the police were not "searching."" 2  The Court reasoned that any activity
conducted outdoors carries with it the risk that a member of the general flying
public could possibly view the activity."7 Thus, rather than engage in a true
Katz analysis, the Court created a very broad doctrine that not only deflects
attention away from the spirit of Katz, but also diminished fourth amendment
privacy rights. 4
upon us hardly means that government is constitutionally unconstrained in adding to those risks."
Id.
168. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
169. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
170. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209 (stating that the police flew over the defendant's property in a
fixed-wing airplane at an altitude of 1,000 feet); Riley, 488 U.S. at 448-49 (reporting that the
officers flew over the defendant's property in a helicopter at an altitude of 400 feet).
171. In Ciraolo, the officers identified marijuana plants eight feet to ten feet in height growing
in the defendant's backyard garden. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. In Riley, the police flew over the
defendant's greenhouse which was located 10 to 20 feet behind his mobile home. Riley, 488 U.S.
at 448. Because two of the roof panels were missing, approximately 10 percent of the roof area,
the officers were able to identify marijuana growing within the greenhouse. Id.
172. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986); Riley, 488 U.S. at 448-50.
173. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (reasoning that the defendant must have
expected that his greenhouse was unprotected from public or official observation from a helicopter
flying within the navigable airspace); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14 (stating that it is irrelevant that
the officers were trained to identify marijuana plants because any member of the general flying
public could have looked down and observed the same thing). But see id. at 224 n.8 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell stated that "[a]s all of us know from personal experience, at least in
passenger aircraft, there rarely-if ever-is an opportunity for a practical observation and
photography of unlawful activity similar to that obtained by (the officers] in this case." Id.
174. The extremely broad and generic doctrine which the Court established in Ciraolo and Riley
stands for the proposition that if an individual risks any public exposure, however slight or minimal,
the police then have a free license to engage in an investigation of that area. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
at 213; Riley, 488 U.S. at 448. This doctrine could dramatically diminish any sense of privacy
which some individuals may have. See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 404. Professor Amsterdam
states that:
[for the tenement dweller, the difference between observation by neighbors and visitors
who ordinarily use the common hallways and observation by policemen who come into
the hallways to "check up" or "look around" is the difference between all the privacy
that this condition allows and none.
Id. Further, subjecting privacy interests to this type of risk-taking analysis could present undue
burdens on those individuals who desire complete privacy. See id. at 402 (stating that while
"anyone can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the cellar, cloaking all the windows
with thick caulking, turning off the lights and remaining absolutely quiet," the Fourth Amendment
was written to keep the homeowner from having to choose between "shutting up his windows or
having a policeman look in."). Professor Amsterdam further notes that if the Fourth Amendment
required this much withdrawal, the kind of open society in which we live would be completely
diminished. Id.
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In addition to the common airplane passenger, the Court in California v.
Greenwood,'75 extended its risk-taking doctrine to include mischievous third
parties who could rummage through one's garbage. 76  Suspecting the
homeowner of dealing drugs, the police in Greenwood obtained several plastic
garbage bags which the homeowner had left at the curb for the local trash
collector."7 In holding that the rummaging through of the defendant's trash
without a warrant was not a "search," the Court reasoned that the homeowner
had abandoned the garbage by placing it outside to be collected by a third
party. " The Court further reasoned that the defendant, by placing the
garbage bags outside, took the risk that animals, vagrants, or mischievous
children may rummage through the trash, thus destroying any reasonable
expectation of privacy."7  Like the decisions in Riley's and Ciraolo,8 ' the
175. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
176. Id. at 40 (holding that the respondents had sufficiently risked exposing their curbside
garbage to the public, thereby relinquishing any fourth amendment privacy right).
177. Id. at 37. The police actually asked the neighborhood trash collector to pick up the
defendant's trash first and then hand it over to the police. Id. The police discovered items
indicative of drug use and, relying on this evidence, obtained a search warrant to search the property
owner's residence. Id. After recovering quantities of hashish and cocaine in the house, the police
arrested the homeowner, who was subsequently indicted on criminal charges. Id. The dissenting
opinion noted that the defendant had left the garbage for the collector in sealed, opaque containers.
Id. at 45 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
178. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41. The Court stated that the defendant had placed his
garbage at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector. Id.
The Court reasoned that the trash collector could have sorted through the refuse himself or could
have permitted others, including the police, to do so. Id. The Court further noted that the garbage
was deposited "in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking,
public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it." Id. (citing United States
v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
The dissenting opinions, however, took a different approach arguing that Greenwood had only
exposed to the public the exterior of several opaque, sealed containers. Id. at 53. The dissent
argued that had Greenwood strewn his trash all over the curb for the entire public to see, the Court's
holding may have had some merit; however, given the facts as they were, Greenwood conveyed the
closed bags not for the purpose of scrutiny but rather for the purpose of disposal. Id. at 54.
179. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of
the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express
purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have
sorted through the respondent's trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.
Id. But see id. at 54 (stating that the mere possibility that meddlers may stumble onto one's property
and sort through containers does not negate one's reasonable expectation of privacy). The dissent
further argued that the possibility of a burglary does not destroy an expectation of privacy in one's
home nor does the possibility that an operator will listen in on a telephone conversation negate one's
expectation of privacy in the words spoken. Id.
180. 488 U.S. 455 (1989). For a discussion of the Court's decision in Riley, see supra notes
169-74 and accompanying text.
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Greenwood decision seized upon the risk-taking doctrine as a substitute to a true
application of the Katz standard."
While the Court's "risk of exposure" doctrine, or at least a derivation of
it, shows up in a variety of different fourth amendment cases," two additional
cases merit discussion.'" The Court in United States v. Knotts' held that
the warrantless placement of a beeper"' in a container taken by the suspect to
track the suspect in his automobile was not a "search.""s The Court reasoned
that the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because any
181. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). The Ciraolo decision is discussed supra notes 168-74 and
accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text. By employing the generic risk-taking
doctrine, the Court escaped asking the "reasonable expectation of privacy" question set forth in
Katz. In fact, the risk-taking notion actually contradicts one of the main precepts of the Katz
decision: "[w]hat a person] . . .seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Thus,
the mere fact that an individual risked public exposure does not end the Katz analysis. The Kaz
inquiry requires a case-by-case analysis of the particular facts involved and requires that the Court
give credence to the express language in Katz rather than creating such sweeping, generic doctrines.
183. See generally Berer, supra note 17, at 394-95 (discussing the Court's use of "the analogy
to private citizens," which operates on the same principles as the "risk of exposure" doctrine).
Professor Berner explains that the Court often invokes images of the general public in determining
whether certain police activity is a "search." Id. at 394. The analogy to private citizens seeks to
legitimize certain police activity by arguing that a private citizen could have legally engaged in the
same activity. Id. at 394-95. Berner, however, rejects this argument, stating that "[w]hen doing
constitutional jurisprudence, references to the legality or illegality of actions of private citizens are
usually beside the point." Id. at 395. The "analogy to private citizens" and the "risk of exposure"
doctrine are simply different ways of phrasing the same notion.
184. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979), are both important fourth amendment cases, not only because they further illustrate how the
Court's "risk of exposure" doctrine deflects attention away from the Katz analysis, but also because
they are frequently cited in cases determining the constitutionality of the warrantless use of the
FLIR. See infra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
185. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
186. A beeper is a radio transmitter which sends a signal of a certain frequency which can be
picked up by a radio receiver. Id. at 277.
187. Id. at 285. In Knous, police officers suspected the defendants of producing illegal drugs,
and they installed a beeper inside a five gallon container of chloroform, a substance used to make
amphetamine, which they believed that the defendants would purchase. Id. at 278. When the
defendants purchased the container, the police used the beeper to track them to one of the
defendants' cabin. Id. Relying on the location of the chloroform and additional information
obtained by the officers, they obtained a search warrant and found formulas for illicit drugs and
$10,000 worth of laboratory equipment. Id. at 279. The Supreme Court ruled that the monitoring
of the beeper signals to track the defendants' car did not invade any reasonable expectation of
privacy and did not amount to a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 285.
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traveler on the public thoroughfares could have seen and followed them. "
Thus, the fact that a person risked some type of public exposure again served
to destroy any reasonable expectation of privacy. In Smith v. Marylands the
Court held that the warrantless use of a pen register"9 by police to record
local phone numbers dialed from a private phone did not constitute a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment.' The Court reasoned that the defendant
"voluntarily" conveyed the phone numbers to the telephone company, thereby
assuming the risk that the company would reveal to the police the numbers
which he dialed."9 While the Court's creation of the risk-taking doctrine as
188. Id. at 281-82. The Court stated that:
[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When [the
defendant] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular
direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when
he exited from public roads onto private property.
Id.
189. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
190. A pen register is a device which is able to record the particular numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring electrical impulses. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
161 n.1 (1977). To avoid a physical trespass into the home or office, the pen register can be
installed at the telephone company.
In Smith, the police installed a pen register at the local telephone company to record the phone
numbers called from the defendant's home. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. The police received
information from a robbery victim that the perpetrator had been calling her on the phone and
harassing her. Id. With enough information to suspect the defendant, but without enough evidence
for probable cause to secure a search warrant, the police utilized the pen register and obtained
evidence that the defendant was the one placing the phone calls. Id. The defendant was indicted
for committing the robbery and sought to suppress "all fruits derived from the pen register" on the
grounds that the police had failed to obtain a search warrant before using the device. Id.
191. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46. The Court in Smith held that the defendant did not form an
actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that he dialed and even if he did, society was
not prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Id. Thus, the Court ruled that the
installation and use of the pen register did not amount to a "search" under the Fourth Amendment
and that a search warrant was not required. Id.
192. Id. at 745-46. First, the Court reasoned that the defendant did not have an actual
expectation of privacy because telephone users typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company and that the phone company records this information for
legitimate business purposes. Id. at 743. Second, the Court stated that society is not prepared
objectively to recognize this expectation as reasonable because by "exposing" the telephone numbers
to the operator, the defendant assumed the risk that the company would reveal this information to
the police. Id. at 744.
The dissent, on the other hand, attacked the Court's inference that exposing the numbers to
the phone company for limited business purposes carried with it the risk that the company would
convey the information to the police. Id. at 749. The dissent argued that Katz is not concerned with
the risks an individual is presumed to accept but rather is concerned with those risks which he
should be forced to assume in a free society. Id. at 750.
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a means of applying the Katz standard has been widely criticized,"9 the Court
continued to create anomalous doctrines rather than apply the true values and
principles expressed in Katz."4
C. The "Intimate Activities" Doctrine
In addition to the Court's resurrection of the "plain view" notiont95 and
its creation of the "risk of exposure" doctrinei" as a means of applying the
Katz standard, the Court also began to focus on the intrusiveness of the police
activity and the extent of intimate information which that activity revealed.1 "7
The case which best illustrates the "intimate activities" analysis is United States
v. Place. 1  In Place, the Court was called on to decide whether the exposure
of luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog was a "search" under the Katz
standard."9  In holding that the canine sniff did not amount to a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment, the Court focused on the very limited nature of
the information disclosed by the method." The Court reasoned that such a
discriminating procedure does not carry with it the same fourth amendment
concerns implicated by more intrusive methods."° Although the Court's focus
on the limited nature of certain police activity in cases like Place has been
193. See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 406 (stating that "[t]he fact that our ordinary social
intercourse, uncontrolled by government, imposes certain risks upon us hardly means that
government is constitutionally unconstrained in adding to those risks.").
194. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanyingtext (discussing the Court's "intimate activities"
argument).
195. See supra notes 152-64 and accompanyingtext, for a discussion of the plain view doctrine.
196. See supra notes 165-92 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the Court's "risk of
exposure" doctrine.
197. See Berner, supra note 17, at 396 (discussing the Court's adoption and utilization of the
"intimate activities" argument in its "search" jurisprudence).
198. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
199. Id. at 696. Upon arriving in New York's La Guardia Airport, the defendant was
approached by law enforcement officers who said that they believed that he was carrying drugs. Id.
After the defendant refused to consent to a search of his luggage, the officers subjected the luggage
to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics dog, obtained a search warrant from the results of the "sniff
test," and ultimately discovered cocaine in the defendant's luggage. Id. At his trial, the defendant
sought to have the evidence excluded, arguing that the warrantless use of the narcotics dog on his
luggage violated his fourth amendment rights. Id. at 696-97.
200. Id. at 707. The Court in Place stated that "the sniff discloses only the presence or absence
of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something
about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited." Id. The Court further stated
that it was aware of no other method of investigation which is so limited both in the manner which
it gleans its information and the specific content of the information gleaned. Id.
201. Id. The Court reasoned that the limited nature of canine sniffs ensures that the property
owner is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience caused by other, less discriminate,
investigatory methods. Id.
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widely criticized,' the Court has consistently employed this principle in its
fourth amendment jurisprudence. 3
In its attempts to apply Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard,
the Court has developed several doctrines which do not remain faithful to the
spirit of Katz.' As a result, Katz's inherent limitations have become less
obvious and more difficult to realize.' The Court's failure to recognize
Katz's logical limitations becomes increasingly dangerous as the police begin
using more highly sophisticated devices, like the FLIR, which are uncommon
in society. 6 The conflicting FLIR cases provide direct evidence that the Katz
standard cannot logically nor fairly be applied to extraordinary devices which
have not become integrated into society.
207
V. THE FLIR CASES
It is no surprise that the courts are split as to whether individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat emanating. from their homes.M
202. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 34, at 709-10. Professor Gutterman argues that
"[a]lthough the technique may be discriminating and minimally offensive as compared to other
detection devices, and may disclose only the presence or absence of limited information, it still
remains as a method to disclose the contents of private property in private, enclosed space." Id. at
710. See also Berner, supra note 17, at 396 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable "searches" and "seizures" not because of the nature or scope of the yielded results,
but rather because they are improper intrusions).
203. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (stating that when the police in a
helicopter peered into the defendant's greenhouse, "no intimate details connected with the use of the
home or curtilage were observed."); Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981) (holding that while the government's use of a startron, a device which "sees" in the dark,
may not always be a "search," its use will raise fourth amendment implications when used to peer
into a house for nine straight days).
204. See supra notes 152-203 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the Court's "plain
view" doctrine, "risk of exposure" doctrine, and "intimate activities" argument.
205. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (stating that high-tech
surveillance may be the "greatest leveler of human privacy ever known"); Amsterdam, supra note
17, at 386 (arguing that the government's proliferation of high-tech surveillance techniques
represents the "frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit
upon human society"); Plaschke, supra note 31, at 624 (reporting that the government in the past
200 years has developed high-tech investigatory equipment with startling efficiency which is capable
of abuse in its application); Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 39 n.94 (warning that the
possibilities of further advances in high-tech surveillance techniques are Orwellian); Steinberg, supra
note 34, at 569 (arguing that highly sophisticated investigatory techniques chill free expression and
encourage arbitrary and inappropriate police conduct).
207. For a list of those cases which are split on the issue of whether the government's use of
the FLIR amounts to a fourth amendment "search," see supra notes 13-15. For a more in depth
discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 219-53 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 13-15.
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This Note does not argue that the courts should answer this question one way
or the other; rather, it argues that the question should not be asked in the first
place. W9  While debate* can arguably ensue concerning one's reasonable
expectation of privacy in phone conversations,"' phone numbers,
21 1
backyard gardens,212 and even garbage, 1 3 it is both illogical and unfair to
apply this standard to heat emanating from one's home. The FLIR is an
uncommon device which is not integrated into society. 2 4 Thus, homeowners
are never given any occasion nor reason to actively develop an expectation of
privacy in the heat emanating off their homes.2"5 Cases which have decided
the FLIR issue have, however, failed to recognize Katz's inherent
limitation.2"6 These cases, like many other. post-Katz cases, utilized the
anomalous doctrines discussed in Section 110'7 as a substitute for those
principles expressed in Katz.218 The remainder of this section will discuss the
conflicting FLIR decisions and the courts' application of the Katz standard to a
device which this standard is incapable of analyzing.
Rather than turning directly to the Katz decision for guidance in
determining whether the use of the FUR is a "search," most courts confronted
with the issue have relied on analogies between thermal surveillance and other
209. See infra § VI.A., for a proposed exception to Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard.
210. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For further discussion of the Katz
decision, see supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
211. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying
text for an analysis of the Smith decision.
212. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). The Riley case is discussed at supra notes
169-74 and accompanying text.
213. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). For further discussion of the
Greenwood decision, see supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 273-76. See also Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 29. Steele
notes that the common member of society does not rent a helicopter and spend the additional $200
in rental fees to engage in the thermal surveillance of homes. Id.
215. See infra § VI.A. (discussing the factors which a court should consider when determining
whether a particular community has given its members occasion to develop an expectation of privacy
in a certain police activity or surveillance device).
216. See infra notes 219-53 and accompanying text. The FLIR cases have avoided a direct
application of the Katz analysis by failing to recognize the standard's inherent limitations. Id.
217. See supra notes 96-146 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (invoking the trespass
doctrine to hold that the FLIR does not penetrate the walls of the home and thus is not a fourth
amendment "search"); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 664 (1994) (holding that the government's use of the FLIR is not a "search" because the
device is very non-intrusive and does not reveal any intimate activities taking place within the home);
United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991), affid on other ground sub
nom. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993) (arguing that the use of the FLIR is
not a "search" because the homeowner risked exposing the "waste heat" when he vented it into the
public airspace).
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investigatory methods analyzed in several of the post-Katz cases.219 Generally,
the courts have utilized those doctrines discussed in the previous section: the
"plain view" doctrine;'n the "risk of exposure" notion; 21 and the "intimate
activities" argument.'
A. The "Plain View" Analogy
Several courts have reasoned that when the police fly over an individual's
home and use a FLIR to measure the heat emanating from the home, they are
merely detecting that which is in "plain view. "'n While this doctrine has
traditionally been limited to situations where the officers discover something in
plain view with their natural senses,'2 the courts are willing to take a leap of
faith and extend this notion to heat, a medium not detectible visually by the
natural senses. The courts have utilized the "plain view" doctrine in
different ways. One court compared the use of the FLIR to that of an aerial
219. See, e.g., Ford, 34 F.3d at 996 (comparing the use of the FLIR with the Court's treatment
of the "open fields" doctrine in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), and with
the "risk of exposure" notion articulated in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)); Pinson,
24 F.3d at 1063 (drawing the analogy between thermal surveillance and the notion of the limited
nature of the information gleaned from canine sniffs in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983)); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1473 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (comparing
the FLIR with the use of the pen register analyzed in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and
with the electronic beeper analyzed in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
220. See supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996-98 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Domitrovich, 852
F. Supp. at 1475 (applying the Court's reasoning articulated in United States v. Johns, 469 U.S.
478, 486 (1985)); United States v. Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 WL 209966, *4 (M.D. Pa., July
27, 1992), affd, I F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993) (utilizing the court's reasoning found in United States
v. Solis, 563 F.2d 880, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1976)).
224. See supra note 167. See also United States v. Ard, 731 F.2d 718, 723 (11th Cir. 1984)
(determining that the owner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when officers found the trailer,
saw burlap bags through a two inch gap between the trailer's doors, smelled marijuana, and were
lawfully on the property); Thomas M. Finnegan et al., Project, Fifieenth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984-1985, 74 GEO. L.J. 499, 520
(1985) (stating that police officers are not "searching" when they discover something through the
use of one or more of their senses from a constitutionally-permissible vantage point). See generally
United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that a homeowner had no
reasonable expectation of privacy as to the home's basement i'hen it can be viewed with the naked
eye from a neighboring property).
225. See supra note 13. Along these same lines, courts also seem to regress back to the
seemingly obsolete trespass doctrine. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D.
Haw. 1991), af'd on other grounds sub noa. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.
1993). The Penny-Feeney court compared the use of the FLIR to aerial surveillance, stating that,
like the aerial surveillance utilized in Ciraolo and Riley, the use of the FLIR was physically non-
intrusive and caused absolutely no physical invasion into the home or curtilage. Id at 227-28.
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mapping camera.' The courts' reasoning, however, seems flawed from the
very beginning because thermal heat emissions are invisible to the naked eye and
can only be detected through the use of highly sophisticated technology.'m
Another court compared thermal imagery with the ability of officers to simply
observe the outward appearance of certain containers and make inferences as to
the containers' contents.' Again, the comparison is misplaced because the
very foundation of the "plain view" doctrine is that the officers are able to
observe something "plainly," with their natural senses.2 In addition to the
"plain view" analogy, courts have also incorporated the "risk of exposure"
doctrine in determining that the use of the FLIR is not a "search" by
characterizing the emissions as "abandoned heat."'
B. Risk of Exposure!"Abandoned Heat"
Another argument adopted by those courts deciding that the use of the FLIR
is not a search analogizes between garbage left at the curb2"' and dispelled
heat. z1 2  In United States v. Penny-Feeney,23 the most widely cited case
226. See United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996-97 (11th Cir. 1994). The court in Ford
compared the FLIR to an aerial mapping camera used to photograph a manufacturing facility. Id.
at 996 (analyzing the Court's reasoning in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238
(1986)). The Ford court stated that the thermal images, like the photographs taken by the mapping
camera, did not penetrate any walls and were incapable of "revealing the intimacy of detail and
activity protected by the Fourth Amendment." Ford, 34 F.3d at 996. The court also discussed the
principles set forth in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that what the officers observe
from a legal vantage point will not amount to a fourth amendment "search").
227. See supra note 55. See also Plaschke, supra note 31, at 619-20 (arguing that the court's
incorporation of the "plain view" doctrine in determining the constitutionality of thermal surveillance
is completely misplaced).
228. See United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1475 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (generally
referring to United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 486 (1987)). The court stated that just because
the officers can glean certain information concerning the inside of the structure, the officers' activity
will not automatically be deemed a "search." Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. at 1475.
229. See supra note 152-63. See also Plaschke, supra note 31, at 619-20. Plaschke argues that
for purposes of the "plain view" doctrine an officer's senses may be enhanced by common devices
like searchlights or binoculars, but the officer's senses may not be "multiplied into new senses"
through the use of highly sophisticated devices like the FLIR. Id.
230. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1063 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United States v.
Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1474 (E.D. Wash. 1994); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F.
Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991), affid on other grounds sub nora. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d
1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
231. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); supra notes 175-82 and accompanying
text.
232. See, e.g., Ford, 34 F.3d at 97; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059; Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at
226.
233. 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), affrd on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
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supporting this argument,' the court reasoned that "waste heat" involves the
same risks of public exposure as does curb-side garbage. 5 The Court stated
that the fact that the heat could not be detected by the natural senses in no way
affected the analysis.' The comparison of "waste heat" with curbside
garbage has been criticized at length as a misplaced analogy, void of any
rational connection. 7 The fact that the courts have struggled to characterize
heat emanating from one's home in the same fashion as garbage left at a curb
for pickup exemplifies Katz's inherent inability to be applied logically or fairly
to extraordinary devices like the FLIR.? While it may be common
234. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (stating that
Penny-Feeney is the most quoted authority on this issue).
235. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226 (stating that "both cases involve a homeowner's
disposing of waste matter in areas exposed to the public"). The court in Penny-Feeney further
argued that by venting heat outside of the home, an individual exposes exhaust vapors and heat to
public observation and consequently cannot claim an actual expectation of privacy in the heat
emanating from an indoor marijuana growing operation. Id. See also United States v. Pinson, 24
F.3d 1056, 1063 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994) (following the Penny-Feeney line
of reasoning that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in "abandoned heat").
236. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226. The court stated that time and again the Supreme
Court has held that the use of extra-sensory equipment does not constitute a "search" for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The court made reference to the following cases which have upheld
the warrantless use of extra-sensory equipment: United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
(placing a beeper in a container and tracking the defendant's movements in his vehicle did not
amount to a "search"); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (employing the aid of a drug-
sniffing canine on defendant's luggage was held not to be a "search"); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979) (using a pen register to obtain the phone numbers dialed from the defendant's home did
not constitute a fourth amendment "search").
The majority of the arguments in Penny-Feeney depend upon analogies to other government
activities and devices which had previously been held to be searches. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp.
at 225-28. By comparing previous cases and utilizing generic doctrines, the FLIR cases in general,
escape a true Katz analysis. See supra notes 218-19. Thus, this note argues that if the courts would
turn directly to the principles enumerated in Katz, they would realize that Katz is a standard of
limited application and that any attempts made to pigeonhole the FLIR analysis into the Katz
standard are both illogical and unfair. See infra § VI.A.
237. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1532-33. The Court in Field stated that while it may be
common knowledge that curbside garbage is accessible to the public at large, "[i]t is hardly common
knowledge that government officials cruise the public streets after dark scanning houses with thermal
imagers, seeking to interpret heat patterns." Id. at 1532. See also Steele, Infrared Searches, supra
note 31, at 28-30. Steele argues that the notion that one voluntarily places garbage on the curb for
pickup cannot possibly be extended to heat emanating from one's home. Id. First, while it requires
no special equipment for an animal, child, scavenger, or snoop to rummage through one's garbage,
thermal surveillance requires very specialized, sophisticated equipment. Id. at 29. Second,
individuals are aware of no other third party waiting to detect heat "who could potentially inspect
it in the same manner as a garbage collector." Id. at 30.
238. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532-33 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (arguing that
the courts cannot logically transfer the reasoning and conclusion in Greenwood into its analysis of
thermal imaging); Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 28-31 (stating that the courts' use of
the garbage-digging analysis in Greenwood to conclude that the use of a FLIR is not a "search" is
completely misplaced).
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knowledge that curbside garbage is accessible to third parties, the use of thermal
imagery to detect heat patterns is not a commonly-known societal activity. 9
In addition to analogies to curbside garbage, courts have also likened
thermal surveillance to the use of beepers and pen registers.' The court in
United States v. Domitrovich2" reasoned that the function of the FLIR is
similar to that of a beeper and a pen register in detecting information which an
individual exposes to the public.2 Again, the Domitrovich court attempted
to pigeonhole its analysis of the FLIR into one of the Court's generic "search"
doctrines' a rather than directly applying the principles established in Katz.
Any attempt at a true Katz analysis would reveal that the FLIR device is not a
part of the social dynamic with which Katz is concerned and, as such, cannot
logically nor fairly be analyzed under the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard.2' In addition to the "plain view" and "risk of exposure" doctrines,
the FLIR cases have also implicated the "intimate activities" 5 notion from
the canine sniff decisions.' "
C. The "Intimate Activities" Analogy
Courts determining that the warrantless use of the FLIR is not a "search"
have relied most heavily on analogies between thermal surveillance and canine
239. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1532-33.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1473 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
(citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
241. 852 F. Supp. 1460 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
242. Id. at 1473. The court in Domitrovich argued that by releasing heat out of the house, the
homeowner relinquishes his expectation of privacy in the heat as well as private information that can
be gleaned from that heat. Id. See also Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (stating that "[w]hen [the defendant]
used his phone, [he] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.").
243. See supra notes 152-203 and accompanying text.
244. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532-33 (W.D. Wis. 1994). The Field
court stated that "[iut is hardly common knowledge that government officials cruise the public streets
after dark scanning houses with thermal imagers, seeking to interpret heat patterns." Id.
The core of the Court's holding in Smith was that telephone callers "realize that they must
convey phone numbers to the telephone company," Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
This realization, arguably, relinquishes the callers' expectation of privacy. Id. The same, however,
cannot possibly be said about the use of thermal surveillance. Individuals do not, nor have they ever
had reason to, realize that high-tech devices are being used to measure fine differences in heat
emanating from their homes.
245. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
246. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th
Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the Place decision, see supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
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sniffs. u7 The courts mainly rely on United States v. Solis,"A which held
that the use of a narcotics dog on the outside of the defendant's trailer to detect
marijuana within the structure was not a "search." 9  Courts have held that
the use of the FLIR is similar to canine sniffs because both methods are
inoffensive and neither entails embarrassment to, or the search of, the
person.21° The courts have further reasoned that neither method is capable of
revealing any intimate details." Like the courts' other attempts to draw such
analogies, likening canine sniffs to FLIR searches has been widely
criticized. 2  This analogy is misplaced because the use of the FLIR is
actually more intrusive than a canine sniff. Additionally, while dogs may be
common to society, the FLIR is a relatively novel device used mainly by
government officials. 3
247. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1063 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 664 (1994); United States v. Deaner, No. 92-009001, 1992 WL 209966, *3-*4 (M.D. Pa., July
27, 1992), affid, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226-
27 (D. Haw. 1991), ajfd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cir 1993).
248. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
249. Id. at 882. In Solis, police officers, acting on an informant's tip that the suspect had
marijuana in his trailer, went to the trailer and found the rear doors covered with talcum powder,
commonly used to conceal the odor of marijuana. Id. at 881. The police then brought narcotics
dogs to sniff the outside of the trailer. Id. The dogs responded, and the police used that evidence
to obtain a search warrant. Id. The court reasoned that the use of the dogs was not a "search"
because the method was not offensive and did not embarrass the suspect, as would a "search" of his
person. Id. at 882. Further, the court relied on the specificity of the information gleaned, stating
that "[tihe target was a physical fact indicative of possible crime, not protected communications."
Id.
250. See Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 WL 209966 at *4; Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at
227. The court in Deaner actually argued that thermal surveillance is less intrusive than canine
sniffs because:
the FLIR is incapable of providing definitive information as to what is happening behind
closed doors other than the generation of heat. A marijuana-sniffing dog, on the other
hand, gives a decisive indication as to the presence of an illegal substance behind closed
doors.
Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 WL 209966 at *4.
251. See United States v. Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 WL 209966 *4 (M.D. Pa. July 27,
1992); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 227 (D. Haw. 1991).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1533 (W.D Wis. 1994); Steele,
Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 30-32.
253. See Steele, Infrared Searches, supra note 31, at 30-32. Steele argues that while
specialized narcotics dogs react solely to drug odors, a FLIR reveals any source of heat. Id. at 31.
Steele further states that "[tihere is no law regulating how much heat a residence may emit and the
radiation of an unusual amount of heat cannot lead directly to an inference of illegal activity in the
same direct manner as the smell of contraband implies its presence." Id. For further criticism of
the courts' analogy between canine sniffs and thermal surveillance, see Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1533.
The court in Field notes that while canine sniffs normally must work close to the targeted objects,
the FLIR is capable of working at a distance of 200 meters. Id. As a result,
a homeowner has some protection from the random use of a drug sniffing dog: unless
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There are two possible approaches to overcoming Katz's inability to
effectively analyze extraordinary devices like the FLIR. First, the Supreme
Court could adopt a completely new "search" test which would be capable of
analyzing all police activity and devices. For the past three decades, fourth
amendment scholars have taken this position, proposing a wide variety of
"search" standards to replace that set forth in Katz. While a completely
new "search" standard would be the most comprehensive solution, the likelihood
that the Court will take such action is speculative at best.s Thus, this Note
adopts the second approach, which is to carve out certain exceptions to the Katz
standard where it would be unreasonable to require individuals to form
expectations of privacy. The following proposed exception seeks to prevent
application of Katz to those devices which are so uncommon to a society that its
members are never given a fair opportunity to develop expectations of privacy.
VI. THE EXTRAORDINARY DEVICE EXCEPrION
As the government's arsenal of high-tech surveillance devices grows,'
Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test will be called on more frequently
to determine the fate of privacy interests guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.' The contradictory holdings in the FLIR cases illustrate the
the homeowner invites the police onto his property (or they have some other legal right
to be present), the dog must operate outside the limits of the curtilage, which typically
would prevent an unconsented search.
Id.
254. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 392-409 (discussing the possibility of creating
a "sliding scale approach" to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard in which the
"search" question would become far less crucial); Berner, supra note 17, at 397-405 (proposing a
"search" test which defines search by focussing on the government activity rather than on an
individual's privacy interests); Michael Campbell, Comment, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search:
A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 207-16 (1986)
(arguing that the Court should adopt a "social norms" standard where government conduct which
violates a social norm of privacy should be deemed a "search"); Gutterman, supra note 34, at 711-
22 (proposing a "value-dominated model" to the Court's "search"jurisprudence); Katz, Twenty-first
Century, supra note 17, at 575-88 (discussing the possibility of the Court adopting a "two-tiered
system" of fourth amendment coverage embracing both searches and intrusions); Serr, supra note
96, at 627-42 (proposing a "private party search" doctrine which would define a "search" by the
degree of public exposure); Steinberg, supra note 34, at 613-28 (arguing that the Court should adopt
a three factor balancing test to its "search" jurisprudence).
255. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2798
(1992) (affirming the powerful doctrine of stare decisis which requires that courts should not lightly
overturn precedent).
256. See supra note 206.
257. See Katz, Twenty-first Century, supra note 17, at 550. The courts' determinations
concerning fourth amendment issues set the level of privacy and freedom for the whole community.
Id. As the police are given more investigatory power in their quest to catch criminals, the effect of
the privacy rights on the community at large grows in "geometric proportion." Id.
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courts' difficulty in applying the Katz test to such a highly sophisticated
device.' This Note does not argue that the Katz standard itself is the root of
the courts' confusion; rather, courts have failed to recognize that Katz is an
inherently limited doctrine which cannot logically nor fairly be applied to certain
devices. 9  Before ascertaining whether an individual manifested a certain
reasonable expectation of privacy, it is first necessary to determine from the
nature of the device at issue whether that individual was realistically able to
form such an expectation. The courts' failure to make such a determination has
led to several questionable decisions,' ° including the FLIR cases," l a
deterioration of the integrity of the Katz decision, 2 and the general decline
of fourth amendment rights so vital to a free society.' The following
proposed exception addresses each of these concerns by judicially recognizing
the inherent limitations of the Katz doctrine and the important role that the social
dynamic plays in fourth amendment jurisprudence.
A. The Exception
The "extraordinary device exception" requires that the court make a
threshold inquiry to determine whether the Katz standard is capable of analyzing
a given governmental device. The exception requires a court to determine if a
certain governmental device is "extraordinary" before it can ask Katz's
"expectation of privacy" question. Those devices found to be "extraordinary"
are excluded from a Katz application and are automatically put to scrutiny under
the Fourth Amendment. '  Those devices which are not "extraordinary" are
put to scrutiny under Katz. The "extraordinary device exception" requires the
court to engage in the following analysis:
1) When a certain governmental device is attacked on the grounds that
it violates the Fourth Amendment, the court must ask:
2) Under community standards, is the device common to society, such
258. For a list of those cases which are split on the issue of whether the warrantless use of the
FLIR is a "search," see supra notes 13-15.
259. See supra notes 146, 152-203 and accompanying text. See also Amsterdam, supra note
17, at 375. Professor Amsterdam states that because fourth amendment law covers such a wide
variety of situations, "it seems too dogmatic and improperly insensitive to the practical complexities
of life to categorize or pigeon-hole situations for the purpose of enforcing a discipline of rules."
Id.
260. See supra notes 146-47.
261. See supra note 13.
262. See supra note 146.
263. See supra notes 28, 146.
264. See Serr, supra note 96, at 587-88. Professor Serf argues that the consequences of
assuming that a certain device is a "search" is hardly a draconian concept, for the Fourth
Amendment merely requires that a certain governmental activity be reasonable. Id.
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that its use and existence has become integrated into the ordinary
societal experience?
A) If the device is uncommon to society and its
use and existence has not become integrated into
the ordinary societal experience, the use of the
device by law enforcement personnel must be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, or
B) If the device is common and its use and
existence has become integrated into the ordinary
societal experience, the use of the device by law
enforcement personnel shall be subject to
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment only if its
use constitutes a "search" as defined by Katz v.
United States .20
Thus, when a certain activity is found by the court to be "extraordinary," it is
automatically deemed a "search" and subjected to scrutiny under the Fourth
Amendment. If, however, the device is found by the court not to be
"extraordinary," it can be put to scrutiny under Katz's "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test.'" Before the specific ramifications of such an exception can
be discussed, it is necessary to further explain two aspects of the exception: 1)
the community-based standard; and 2) the factors which a court should consider
in determining if a particular device is common to the societal experience.
1. The Community Standard
When determining if a particular device is common to the societal
experience, the courts should employ a community standard. The nature of the
"exceptional device" inquiry requires that courts actually examine the dynamic
relationship between the individual and society to determine if a particular device
is integrated into that relationship. This examination can most effectively be
administered under a community standard. The narrowly-tailored focus of a
community standard makes such an examination more practical and recognizes
265. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a discussion of Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy
standard, see supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text. When a particular device is found to be
sufficiently integrated into the societal experience, then it is fair and logical to speak in terms of an
individual's expectation of privacy in relation to the device.
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that vast societal differences may exist from one community to the next.
Further, community standards have been employed in other instances where the
court is required to examine a certain aspect of society.'
2. "Extraordinary" Factors
Under the community-based standard described above, a court must
determine whether a certain device is common and integrated into the societal
experience. While the notion of a certain device being common to society has
been recognized in other contexts, it has never been explicitly integrated into
fourth amendment jurisprudence.' Although a court may consider several
factors in determining if a given device is integrated into society, the underlying
concern should always be whether it would be logical and fair to require an
individual to form an expectation of privacy in relation to a particular device or
investigatory method. Factors which a court may consider include:
a) the level of technology and sophistication of the
device;
b) the extent to which the device is commercially
available;'
c) the extent to which the device may be used in
nongovernmental contexts; and
267. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973) (holding that the jury should
consider contemporary community standards in determining whether or not certain materials are
obscene); FED. R. EVtD. 201(b) (requiring courts to look to the community to determine if a certain
fact is generally known for purposes of judicial notice).
268. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (stating that "[ilt
may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of private property by using highly
sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public . . . might be
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."); Katz, Twenty-first Century, supra note 17, at 576.
Professor Katz argues that the Katz formula consists of "measuring protected interests by the
common understanding of citizens in a free society." Id. See also Steele, Remote Sensing, supra
note 94, at 329. Steele states that "[n]o standard or threshold, however, has been set to interpret
such phrases as 'widely available commercially,' 'not more sophisticated than [technology] generally
available to the public,' or 'conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used.'" Id.
269. See Steele, Remote Sensing, supra note 94, at 330. To show general availability of
satellite imagery, Steele argues that the "searcher should need to introduce evidence not only of
gross sales, but also of the various uses of satellite imagery, such as media, agriculture, forestry,
geology, civil engineering, land-use planning, cartography, coastal-zone management, and
environmental monitoring." Id.
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d) the duration in which the device has been in
existence .
21
While such a specific list of enumerated factors is helpful for the court, the
essential element is that the courts recognize Katz's inherent limitations and
begin asking these kinds of questions.
B. Why Adopt the "Extraordinary Device Exception"?
The "extraordinary device exception" will improve the courts' fourth
amendment jurisprudence in two distinct ways. First, it will put integrity back
into the Katz standard because it will ensure that Katz is not applied to a
situation which it cannot logically or fairly handle. In this sense, the proposal
is really not an exception at all but rather a recognition of the limited scope of
the Katz decision. The proposal forces courts to search beyond the generic
doctrines which have surfaced27 and to instead focus on the social dynamic
which lies at the heart of the Katz decision. Those devices which do not play
a role in the social dynamic are exempted from a Katz analysis rather than
illogically forced through the standard Recognizing Katz's inherent limits will
regain its integrity and recapture its original spirit.
A second positive effect of the "extraordinary device exception"' is that it
will represent fourth amendment privacy interests more fairly and accurately
than the current scheme. Fourth amendment rights concerning devices which
are "extraordinary" in a certain community will no longer hinge on an unfair or
illogical application of the Katz standard. If it is unfair or illogical to require
that an individual form an expectation of privacy in relation to a certain device
or investigatory method, the government activity will automatically be deemed
a "search." Consequently, the individual will be afforded the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. This process is consistent with the notion that privacy
interests are a vital aspect of our society and should be assumed to exist unless
clear and reasonable reasons state otherwise.2' Given the particularized
community standard, it is difficult to determine exactly which existing devices
would be found to be "extraordinary;" however, the FLIR is one device which
appears to fall into this category.
C. The FUR as an "Extraordinary Device"
Currently, it is safe to claim that FLIR technology in any community is not
270. These factors should not necessarily be viewed as an absolute list but rather should be used
to help the court answer the overarching question concerning commonality and social integration.
271. See supra notes 152-203 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 28.
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a common instrument which has been integrated into the societal experience.'
The device is used almost exclusively by the government for either military
purposes or investigatory purposes. 2 4 Its commercial availability is very
limited. 5s Its very high level of sophistication has only been in existence for
a relatively short time. 6  Most important, however, is that it is simply
illogical and unfair to require that persons form an expectation of privacy in the
"waste heat" emanating from their homes. Society has never given its members
occasion to form such an expectation, and it goes directly against the precepts
of the Fourth Amendment and the Katz decision to make one's privacy interest
dependant upon the formation of such an exception. This Note does not suggest
that the government should not be allowed to use extraordinary devices like the
FLIR. However, it asserts that the government must merely operate within the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard when it does.
VII. CONCLUSION
As we are fast approaching a new millennium, advanced technologies are
rapidly being developed to meet the needs of our changing society. This
advancement includes the government's utilization of high-tech surveillance
devices to combat our Nation's ever-increasing crime rate. While the Fourth
Amendment was embedded in our Constitution to protect us from those
government activities which become unreasonable, the courts have slowly eroded
the effectiveness of this protection. One significant reason for this erosion is the
courts' failure to recognize Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as
a limited doctrine which, because of its limitations, is unable to logically or
fairly analyze highly sophisticated devices. This failure has greatly undermined
the integrity of the Katz analysis, as well as the privacy rights afforded by the
Fourth Amendment. This Note's "extraordinary device exception" seeks to
regain Katz's integrity and restore those privacy rights so vital to the survival
of our society.
The proposed exception recognizes the fact that the Katz analysis is
inherently limited to only those situations where a particular community has
given its members the opportunity and reason to form a specific expectation of
273. See supra notes 43-78 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Cusumano, 67
F.3d 1497, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that it is doubtful "that society is aware that heat
signatures can be read with any greater accuracy than tea leaves").
274. See supra note 68.
275. See id. for a discussion of the FLIR's limited role in society. See also United States v.
Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1532-33 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (stating that the FLIR is not the type of
instrument commonly known to exist in a community).
276. See United States v. Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 WL 209966, *2 (M.D. Pa., July 27,
1992), aft'd, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that thermal imager technology has been in existence
for approximately fifteen years).
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privacy. If a device is found to be common to society under the exception, then
it is fair to apply Katz. However, devices like the FLIR which are not
integrated into the normal societal experience have no place within the Katz
analysis and must be put to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. As long as
the courts continue to use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard, an
"extraordinary device exception" is necessary to strike the proper balance
between the quest for law and order and the reverence for individual privacy
interests.
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Smith: Thermal Surveillance and the Extraordinary Device Exception: Re-D
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 [1996], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss3/7
